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LIST OF PARTIES 
All parties to this appeal and to the proceedings below are listed in the case 
caption. Shell Oil Company was dismissed from the proceedings below and Bill C. 
Buhler did not petition for interlocutory appeal and is not a party to this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2001) (appeals from judgments over which the Court of 
Appeals lacks original appellate jurisdiction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue presented on interlocutory appeal from summary judgment is: When 
does the statute of limitations begin to run for a cost allocation and recovery action under 
the Underground Storage Tank Act ("UST Act99)? Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-401-429 
(1998) and (Supp. 2001). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellate review of a trial court's summary judgment decision is de novo. "A 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal one and 
will be reviewed for correctness." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 913 P.2d 731, 
733 (Utah 1995). Accordingly, this Court owes no deference to the trial court's decision. 
American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996). This 
issue was preserved below by the petition for interlocutory review of the trial court's 
ruling on Marathon's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative for this appeal. 
1. Utah Underground Storage Tank Act or (the "UST Act), Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 19-6-401 to 19-6-429 (1998) and (Supp. 2001) (set forth in Addendum 6). 
2. "An action may be brought within three years: 
* * * 
(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than for a penalty 
or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where in special cases a different 
limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1996). 
3. "The limitations in this article apply to actions brought in the name of or for 
the benefit of the state or other governmental entity, the same as to actions by private 
parties, except under Section 78-12-33.5." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-33 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the release of petroleum from leaking underground storage 
tanks at a former gas station located at 148 East Center Street, Monticello, Utah (the 
"Site"). The State of Utah (the "State") first learned of the problem in 1980. See 
Deposition of K. Brent Redd, ("Redd Depo.") (R. 902, Exhibit 24 at 1.) The State did an 
investigation and issued a report on the problem in 1981 which detailed its determination 
that no further action was immediately necessary, however, the report noted that 
additional cleanup may be required in the future. (See Redd Depo., R. 902, Exhibit 24 at 
8.) The gas station closed down in 1991 and the State was also informed by the 
Southeastern Utah District Health Department that the tanks had leaked. (R. at 515, 542.) 
The State, through a April, 7, 1992 letter asked Woody's Enterprises, who at the time 
2 
owned the Site, tc begii 1 cleai n lp of tl ic Site (R. j i / - i o . ) The State made repeated 
requests for Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd, the Site's prior owner, to clean up the 
Site, (R, at 521-40.) VV ood; > i,uLerpiis^s and IJI^.M ,-.V*".W ,1 , . ,^ . - Ju>pite the 
the Site from Woody's Enterprises on October 14, 1996. I he State began to clean up the 
Site with its own funds by early 1995. (R. at 553.) The State waited until September 16, 
After the parties had conducted limited discovery in this matter, defendants moved 
Mr nummary judgment <>n the grounds that the Skih h jd Hied 'his suit beyond the 
appiK,,u>ic three-year St...... . ...
 ( :• •uui euuc ;\m ; ). 
r L ' -1 -* the State's cause of action in this case accrued each time and 
oi il) vv hen a cleanup cost p^-^u-nt was made by the State. The trial couit ?;>ade no 
hndihg> oi i.n.i h> its summary judgmui, <u, . ion. 
STATEMF" s % t * ' * " WSPin » *- i - » s1 
1. "The State alleges thai '*-; •*'•'. > responsinie parts for releases of 
petroleum products In in nikduj'ioiiiid slma^c Links ( 'tanks ') Ihal Viae pail ol «i U iiuer 
service station located at 148 East Center Street, Monticello, I Jtah, further described as 
Lot 3, Block 22, Monticello Township survey, Plat "A" Ohc "Site") 'R,, at 461 ) 
The State acknowledged befon tin u-.- p«... .. <•. • ;rpositioi i to 
Defendant Marathon Oil's Motion for Summary Judgm* -i- »• * v (bets are not in 
dispute for purposes of this statute of limitations analysis. (R. at 621., 
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2. On June 23, 1991, six tanks were removed from the Site. (R. at 461.) 
3. No additional tanks remain at the Site. (R. at 461.) 
4. Sampling performed during removal of the tanks in 1991 indicated that 
releases of petroleum products had occurred. (R. at 461.) 
5. The release was first reported to the State of Utah, Department of 
Environmental Quality, Division of Environmental Response and Remediation, on July 
29,1991. (R. at 461.) 
6. In December 1991, defendant Woody's Enterprises submitted a subsurface 
investigation to the State. (R. at 461.) 
7. Between 1991 and 1994, plaintiffs demanded that defendants Woody's 
Enterprises and Brent Redd conduct abatement, investigative, and corrective action at the 
Site as required by the UST Act. (R. at 462.) 
8. Defendants Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd did not comply with the 
State's demands because they were unable or unwilling to do so. (R. at 462.) 
9. On March 18, 1993, the State informed Brent Redd that he had failed to 
take abatement, investigative and corrective action required by the UST Act. (R. at 462.) 
10. In 1994, the State conducted another preliminary review of the property. 
(R. at 462.) 
11. By March 1995, the State contracted with consultants Eckhoff, Watson and 
Preator Engineering and began investigation and cleanup at the Site. (R. at 462.) 
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12. Plaintiffs did not file this si lit m iiit.il September 1(>, i w o . (R. at 793.) 
SI JMMARY O F T H E A R G U M E N T 
Faced i ith deten ninii lg \ \ 1 len tl le State' s cause of actioi i acci i led I it idei the I IS- T 
A
 c t, the trial coin t iiiiproperly ruled that the State has an unlimited number of causes of 
action and that each cause of action accrues when the State paid a bill for cleanup costs. 
..I oLtumilling "what date the State s cause of action accrued, the trial coi n t 1 lad 
in in ill in y .illrinntives mill nl.ifrs iiv.uLnblli In huosc from Flie e v ents that the ti ial court 
could have selected as the last event necessary to tomplu - the Slate* - cause of action are 
listed and described in hxhibn -i > include: (1) Brent Redd mloinung ifu M,»u iiuit 
I . . - ' ' " O 
conip* • with the o o l Act, ^j) the Statu deciding to perforin Ab ^v\i, eka i iu r , (4) the 
State obtaining funding for the cleanup; (5) State contractors commencing cleanup at the 
•. . t i 
State funds at the site; (8) State approval of contractor invoices for site cleanup; Wi the 
State's payment of contractor invoices; and (10) each payment by the State, regardless of 
In i1, lliiiiif ineidui .yii'i nl Ilk >i. a n n u l dales, exu pi lln Lid iillill liiiiii lllllln S ta les 
claim. The trial court disregarded the first nine alternatives and chose the tenth, the only 
accrual theory that allowed the State's claim to survive, 
I he trial coi n I s ruling creates an unworkable sit uation and effecti v el> v itiates tl le 
t, 
(whether they involve the State or private parties). Under the trial court 's ruling, any 
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party can delay cleanup of a leaking tank until the latest possible time, then extend that 
time by refusing to make payment until the last possible moment. 
As described below, Marathon posits that the statute of limitations began running 
either (1) upon the State's initiation of cleanup activities; or (2) by the failure of the Site's 
"current owners" (Brent Redd and Woody's Enterprises) to perform cleanup which was 
demanded by the State in 1993. 
Both positions are supported by applicable law and comport with the public policy 
behind the statute of limitations. Whatever else this Court determines, and regardless of 
which alternative this Court chooses, the current decision of the trial court should not be 
affirmed. The practical effect of such a ruling is unpalatable and contradictory to the 
public policy behind the statute of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S CLEANUP WORK AT THE SITE IN EARLY 1995 WAS 
THE LAST EVENT NECESSARY TO TRIGGER THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 
A. Statutes of Limitations Are Designed to Prevent Surprise Litigation 
After Witnesses Have Disappeared, Documents Have Been Lost, and 
Memories Have Faded 
It is well settled that statutes of limitations are vital for ensuring that justice is 
administered fairly and efficiently. 
The governing policy in this area, as declared by the United 
States Supreme Court, is that statutes of limitations 'are 
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
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have disappeared.' 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Railroad Telegraphers v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). As described below, 
Marathon has suffered the exact consequences of the delay that the statute of limitations 
is meant to prevent. 
During the brief period of discovery prior to the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment, Marathon learned that virtually all potentially useful information related to the 
operational history of the Site had been lost. Prior to this time, but after the State 
determined that cleanup of the Site was necessary, documents were destroyed and 
witnesses died or became impossible to find. For example, in 1997, Brent Redd burned 
30 boxes of documents that related to operations at the Site. (See Redd Depo., R. 902 at 
112-15). Ron Van Wagonner, the only known individual with extensive firsthand 
knowledge about the tanks, including tank system design, repairs, changes, and removal, 
died approximately four years ago. This is especially significant in that he performed the 
actual removal of the tanks in 1991. Other witnesses, such as Paul Redd and Verlynn 
Banks—both of whom where heavily involved with Abajo Petroleum, the company that 
handled the administration of the former service station—have moved away and their 
exact whereabouts are no longer known. (See Redd Depo., R. 902 at 119-20). Moreover, 
they are probably no longer subject to the subpoena power of the Utah courts. 
Even parties to this litigation (such as Brent Redd) who worked at the Site and 
have extensive firsthand experience with the Site, have forgotten much information in the 
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intervening years and are unable to recall many details. (See, e.g., Redd Depo., R. 902 at 
117-40.) Brent Redd's answer to numerous questions about activities at the Site, 
management of the Site, insurance for the Site and the status and location of other 
witnesses he worked with at the Site was often "I don't know," "I don't remember," or "I 
don't recall." Id. An opportunity to depose Brent Redd and other individuals with 
knowledge about the Site at an earlier time would likely have been much more 
productive. All of these events were out of Marathon's control, occurred prior to 
Marathon's knowledge of the State's claim, and occurred during the window of time in 
which the State should have filed its claim. 
1. The State's Claim Is Subject to a Three-Year Statute of 
Limitations 
Pursuant to the UST Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-401-429, the State is seeking 
reimbursement of "all expenditures from the LUST Trust and PST Funds that have been 
and will in the future be made to investigate, abate and remediate the petroleum releases 
and contamination caused by the Facility in Monticello, Utah." (First Amended 
Complaint, R. at 121.) The applicable statute of limitations for plaintiffs' claims is three 
years. "An action may be brought within three years . . . for a liability created by the 
statutes of this state . . . " Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-26(4) (1996). The State agrees that 
this is the applicable statute of limitations. 
Additionally, there is no question that statutes of limitations apply to government 
entities the same as they do to private parties. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-33 (1996). The 
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precedent set by this case affects all cost allocation actions under the UST Act, including 
those brought both by the State and private parties. The consequence of allowing the 
State's claim in this case will be elimination of the statute of limitations as it applies to all 
cost allocation actions. Private parties will no longer be required to bring a claim within 
three years of learning that cleanup will be required for gasoline that has leaked from 
tanks that are, or have been, on their property. In a position identical to the State's, 
parties will be able to wait indefinitely and revive their claims through belated spending. 
2. The Statute of Limitations Begins to Run upon the Last Event 
Necessary to Complete the Cause of Action 
A limitations period normally runs from the date of accrual, which is the 
"happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Warren v. Provo 
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Utah 1992). This rule is intended to further the 
policy of "preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared." Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. "As a general rule, a cause of action accrues when 
a plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion." 
DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996). 
Accordingly, the issue before this Court is whether the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action occurred more than three years prior to plaintiffs' filing of 
this suit on September 16, 1998. The undisputed facts of this case make it clear that the 
State's cause of action accrued prior to September 16, 1995, and their claims, therefore, 
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are time-barred. The State "could have first filed and prosecuted [this] action to 
successful completion" by early 1995, when it decided to clean up the Site itself. DOIT, 
926 P.2d at 843. Just as the plaintiffs in DOIT were held to have a viable cause of action 
upon learning of the defendants' state securities violations, the State's cause of action 
was completed when the State determined it would conduct its own cleanup of the Site. 
Nothing of importance happened in the intervening period between early 1995 and 
September 16, 1998 that created a cause of action for the State that was not already 
actionable in the courts by early 1995 when the State initiated its cleanup activities. 
B* Under Utah Law the State's Cause of Action Accrued When the State 
Began Cleanup Activities at the Site 
Over ten years ago, defendant Woody's Enterprises removed all of the tanks from 
the Site. (R. at 461.) On July 29, 1991, Rick Meyer, a Southeastern Utah District Health 
Department employee, reported the release at the Site to the State. (R. at 515, 542.) The 
State assigned its employee, Mike Pfeiffer, to monitor the Site. (R. at 515.) 
Defendant Woody's Enterprises contracted with Wasatch Geotechnical, Inc., to 
investigate the Site, and provided a report of this investigation to the State on or about 
December 10, 1991. (R. at 461.) The report confirmed that significant levels of 
petroleum were present in the environment at the Site. (R. at 479.) The report 
summarized the risks posed by the site stating, "site sensitivity analysis . . . indicates a 
Level I (highest) Environmental Site Sensitivity for the Woody's #126 site." (R. at 482, 
emphasis added.) In its conclusions the Report stated: 
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Investigations to date indicate significant petroleum 
hydrocarbon release and groundwater impact at the Woody's 
#126 gasoline station. Chemical analysis of collected soil and 
groundwater samples indicate hydrocarbon concentrations 
above State RCLs and Federal Drinking Water Standards. 
The hydrocarbon chemistry patterns appear to be complex, 
and indicate two primary release source areas: Excavation 1 
and the dispenser area. Integrated patterns further indicate 
hydrocarbon migration at depth toward the east and northeast 
at least to the property boundary. 
Further investigation will likely be required by the Utah 
Division of Environmental Response and Remediation to 
determine the full extent of impacted soil and groundwater 
both down gradient (east, northeast) and laterally (north and 
south). Additional investigation up gradient (northwest) may 
be advised to explore the possibility for off-site sources 
impacting the Woody's #126 property through migration 
along the Central Street utility corridor. 
(R. at 483.) Despite these serious concerns, which were identified and forwarded to the 
State in December 1991, and Woody's Enterprises' inability or unwillingness to take any 
additional action at the Site, the State took no action. Additionally, the State did not seek 
any legal action against Woody's Enterprises or Brent Redd. Remarkably, the State 
failed to contact Marathon about this issue. 
Between 1991 and 1994, the State sent numerous letters demanding defendants 
Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd clean up the Site. (R. at 462.) The State warned 
Brent Redd of his UST Act violations in 1993 and stated that he would "be subject to cost 
recovery of all funds expended by the State of Utah." (R. 543.) Throughout this period, 
however, the State never sought any legal recourse and made no attempts to find or 
contact Marathon. (R. at 465.) The State continued to devote resources to the Site, 
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however, and revisited the Site in September 1994. (R. at 462.) Based on this visit to the 
Site it was determined that "this facility be considered for State or Federal monies, so that 
appropriate abatement and remedial steps can be taken, to protect human health and the 
environment." (R. at 550.) By this point the State had received multiple replies from 
defendant Brent Redd indicating that he was unwilling or unable to pay for cleanup of the 
Site. (R. at 550.) Furthermore, the State had a rough cost estimate of $150,000 to clean 
up the Site. (R. at 551.) However, the State still failed to make any effort to contact 
Marathon or initiate a liability allocation against any defendants. 
By March 1995, plaintiffs' consultant Eckhoff, Watson and Preator Engineering 
was performing cleanup work at the Site. (R. at 462.) Based on this information, the 
statute of limitations for the State's claim for allocation of liability against Marathon ran 
as of March 1998 at the latest, because the State's claim fully accrued outside the statute 
of limitations period. As this Court has stated in numerous opinions, the statute of 
limitations begins to run as soon as the plaintiff can pursue its claim successfully in court. 
See, e.g., DOIT, 926 P.2d at 843 (holding that plaintiffs' knowledge of securities 
violations triggered the statute of limitations as plaintiffs "could have first filed and 
prosecuted an action to successful completion"); Myers, 635 P.2d at 86-87 (holding that 
"a cause of action accrues upon the last event necessary to complete the cause of action" 
unless the plaintiff has no means of discovering the facts creating the cause of action). 
The State had the same claim in 1998 as it had by early 1995, and its failure to pursue this 
12 
claim within the statute of limitations period bars the State's claim. The State's decision 
to delay cleanup of the Site and the fact that cleanup still remains to be done, does not 
provide the State with an exemption from the statute of limitations at Marathon's 
expense. Such a result would effectively allow parties to wait indefinite periods before 
initiating action at a Site or seeking allocation of costs under the UST Act. 
The State has argued that its cause of action is similar to a continuing nuisance or 
trespass, in an effort to take advantage of the variable accrual date afforded by this cause 
of action. (R. at 623.) The State is wrong. There is nothing continuing about this injury. 
In Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995), appealed on other 
grounds after remand, 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998), this Court addressed the issue of 
when the statute of limitations accrues for an environmental claim based on the common 
law causes of action of nuisance or trespass. Walker was based upon the intrusion of a 
plume of gasoline onto neighboring properties from two gas stations in Moab, Utah. A 
property owner affected by the plume sued for damages resulting from the contamination. 
Walker, 902 P.2d at 1230-31. Although this case did not involve the UST Act, the statute 
of limitations is still triggered "upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action." Walker, 902 P.2d at 1231 (citing Warren v. Provo City 
Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992)). This Court held that "[w]hen a cause of action 
for nuisance or trespass accrues for statute of limitations purposes depends on whether 
the nuisance or trespass is permanent or continuing." Walker, 902 P.2d at 1232. 
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The State's attempt to analogize its claim to a continuing nuisance or trespass is 
irreconcilable with its claim for all damages—past and future. (R. at 120-21.) As this 
Court stated in Walker, claims based on theories of continuing harm are limited to injury 
suffered within the last three years. Walker, 902 P.2d at 1232; see also Capogeannis v. 
Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). The State's claim seeks 
all past and future costs associated with the Site. According to Walker, this type of 
remedy is analogous to a permanent nuisance or trespass. 
Permanent trespass or nuisance claims accrue from the time the nuisance is created 
or discovered. See Walker, 902 P.2d at 1232. This issue was revisited in Walker Drug 
Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) ("Walker II"), and this Court 
clarified that the plaintiffs' property must be subject to a continuing intrusion of gasoline 
from the neighboring gas stations before damages based on a temporary or continuing 
harm were available. The Walker II parties stipulated for the damages phase of the trial 
that contamination continued to enter the property from the neighboring gas stations as 
petroleum products were released from the "smear zone" due to water table fluctuations. 
Walker II, 972 P.2d at 1241, 1247. Without this continued invasion from off-site 
sources, the Walkers would have had no basis for recovering damages resulting from a 
continuing injury. See Walker II, 972 P.2d at 1247. 
No such off-site invasion is occurring at the Site. Therefore, the continuing injury 
doctrine from Walker is not applicable. Although the Walkers were not seeking cost 
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allocation under the UST Act, this Court described that in any case, the underlying facts 
causing economic harm (here, the release of gasoline from the tanks) forms the cause of 
action, not the economic harm that may be claimed many years later. See Walker II, 972 
P.2d at 1248. 
Another case, Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996), cited by the 
State in its trial court brief, is also instructive as to why a variable accrual date is 
unworkable. Seale was a medical malpractice case involving the misdiagnosis of cancer. 
It clearly states that only one cause of action exists for any given injury and the 
underlying claim must cover all current and future damages. See Seale, 923 P.2d at 1364 
("once some harm is manifest, the limitations period begins to run on all claims, present 
and future.") This Court's analysis in Seale makes perfect sense. Without such a rule, 
claims would never become final. Not only would parties be surprised by unknown, stale 
claims from many years ago, but parties would be subject to repeated claims based upon 
the same injury and underlying events. Litigation on any given case would have no 
definite conclusion. 
While the State's claim is based on the UST Act, the principle behind the 
applicable statute of limitations is the same—once a party is aware that it has been 
injured it must seek all of its damages in one cause of action. The State's approach to 
this case is analogous to an accident victim who makes a claim for orthopedic injuries in 
one year, and subsequently claims extensive neurological injuries from the same accident 
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in a separate lawsuit several years later. Such an approach, whether under common law 
or the UST Act, is simply unworkable. Once a party has been injured it must pursue all 
claims, present and future. 
As set forth in Exhibit 1, the date on which the State was injured could be as early 
as November 13, 1992 and as late as June 21, 1995. In any event, the State's claims did 
not accrue after September 16, 1995. The State has filed such an action for all claims, 
present and future. However, it has failed to do so in a timely fashion. 
The State could have easily avoided the statute of limitations issue in this case by 
initiating the very same liability allocation proceeding currently before this Court at an 
earlier time—within the statute of limitations. There is no ongoing harm in this case in 
that no gasoline was released after the tanks were removed in 1991. The State is simply 
incurring costs related to conditions that the State has been keenly aware of since 1991. 
In sum, the State has no applicable legal basis to avoid the statute of limitations by 
incurring costs for a gasoline release that ended over ten years ago. 
C, Other Jurisdictions Properly Start the Statute of Limitations from the 
Time a Plaintiff Knows It Will Be Required to Clean Up a Site 
Minnesota is but one example of a state that has addressed the issue of when a 
statute of limitations begins to run under environmental cleanup statutes which, similar to 
the Utah UST Act, do not contain an express statute of limitations provision. In Union 
Pacific R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1998) affd, 215 F.3d 
830 (8th Cir. 2000), the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 
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addressed the issue of when a cost recovery claim under an environmental cleanup statute 
(similar to the Utah UST Act) accrued for statute of limitations purposes. The court held 
that since the Minnesota cleanup statute did not limit a party to only liability for costs it 
had previously incurred, and since the statute recognized that a party may sue under the 
statute before any response costs are incurred at all, the statutory cleanup cost 
reimbursement claims were properly timed by the same accrual date as common law 
causes of action. Union Pacific, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 865. The court held that the plaintiffs 
reimbursement claims for cleanup costs were time-barred if the plaintiff knew it would 
incur response costs outside of the statute of limitations period. Id 
The similarities between the Minnesota statute interpreted by the Union Pacific 
court and Utah's UST Act are compelling. The UST Act also does not limit a party to 
only liability for costs it had previously incurred and recognizes that a party may sue 
under the statute before any response costs are incurred at all. Utah Code Ann.§§ 19-6-
420, 19-6-424.5 (1998). Accordingly, the State's claims under the Act, regardless of 
whether they are statutory or common law-based, accrued upon the State's knowledge of 
the release, or initiation of cleanup at the latest, and are time barred. (R. at 461.) 
Additional jurisdictions have arrived at the same conclusions and held that a new 
cause of action is not created by subsequent damages arising out of the same underlying 
injury. In Carpenter v. Texaco, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 398 (Mass. 1995), the plaintiff sought to 
preserve claims under the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention 
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Act as well as common law claims by asserting that the persistence and mobility of 
gasoline on her property was analogous to a continuing nuisance, perpetuating her cause 
of action. Id. at 399. The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating: 
a continuing trespass or nuisance must be based on recurring 
tortious or unlawful conduct and is not established by the 
continuation of harm caused by previous but terminated 
tortious or unlawful conduct. The cases on which the 
plaintiffs rely concern not a single encroachment resulting in 
permanent harm but rather repeated or recurrent wrongs 
involving new harm to property on each occasion. The 
gasoline on the plaintiffs' property is the consequence of 
tortious conduct and of seepage that occurred before 1985. 
There is, therefore, no continuing trespass or nuisance. 
We decline to recognize for the first time a continuing 
trespass or continuing nuisance concept in the circumstances 
such as exist in this case, in part, because, in adopting a three 
year statute of limitations in 1992 for private actions under 
G.L. c. 2IE, the Legislature stated a guiding public policy. 
There is no distinguishing reason to justify our granting relief 
under a label of continuing nuisance in this case when the 
Legislature did not recognize a similar concept of a 
continuing wrong under G.L. c. 21E in its 1992 enactment of 
a statute of limitations for G.L. c. 2 IE. 
Carpenter, 646 N.E.2d at 399-400 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
Likewise, as the State has admitted in its opposition filing, they seek damages relating to 
conditions that have not changed since 1991, when the tanks were removed. (R. at 621.) 
If the Utah legislature intended to provide plaintiffs with a continuing cause of action it 
would have written it into the UST Act. 
Colorado courts have also held that claims are time-barred if they are based upon 
underground storage tank releases from that occurred outside of the statute of limitations 
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period. Kohler v. Germain Inv. Co., 934 P.2d 867, 869-70 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). 
Kohler is similar to Walker and Walker II in that the plaintiffs' claims for damages 
resulting from gasoline releases were based on common law causes of action. However, 
the principle is just as instructive. In Kohler, plaintiffs received a report documenting 
gasoline contamination on their property in August of 1989. Kohler, 934 P.2d at 868. 
The plaintiffs received a second report in July 1993 that documented additional 
contamination that was determined to have occurred sometime after December 1991. 
Kohler, 934 P.2d at 868-69. The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in November 1993. Kohler, 
934 P.2d at 868. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs' knowledge of 
gasoline releases affecting their property triggered the statute of limitations in 1989. 
Kohler, 934 P.2d at 869-70. However, releases occurring after December 1991, as 
documented in the 1993 report, constituted a new cause of action accruing within the 
statute of limitations period which was not time-barred. Kohler, 934 P.2d at 870. 
In this case, the same rule applies. The State received notification of a release in 
1980 and again in 1991. (Redd Depo., R. 902, Exhibit 24 at 1; R. at 461.) In 1991 the 
State also received a report documenting an investigation of the release. (R. at 461.) 
However, unlike Kohler, no additional gasoline was released after 1991 when the tanks 
were removed from the Site. Thus, the State of Utah's claim is entirely time-barred. 
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D. The State's Lack of Property Interest in the Site Does Not Affect the 
Statute of Limitations 
In its papers filed with the trial court, the State argued that cases such as Walker 
are inapposite because the State does not have a property interest in the Site. (R. at 622.) 
The State tries to distinguish itself as a party that has no property interest in the Site and 
as such deserves special treatment similar to a common law indemnitee whose claim does 
not accrue until payment of the obligation. (R. at 622-24.). The State's position is 
irrelevant. Utah law specifically requires that the State be subject to the same statutes of 
limitations as private parties. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-12-33. There is no exception based 
on property ownership and the State does not deserve special treatment. 
1. The State's Claim Against Marathon Is Not Analogous to an 
Indemnity Action 
On October 11, 2000, the trial court notified the parties of its rulings on the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment. In its ruling on Marathon's motion, the trial 
court stated that it was "persuaded that the plaintiffs' cause of action in this case accrued 
when a cleanup cost payment was made by the plaintiffs." (R. at 817.) In its ruling on 
Brent Redd's motion the trial court provided slightly more detail on this analysis and 
stated that it was "persuaded that the law of indemnification applies and. . . that each 
payment is the accrual of a new cause of action under UCA 78-12-26(4)." (R. at 811.) 
The trial court's reliance on the indemnity theory is incorrect. The UST Act, 
which is the sole basis for the State's claims, makes no mention of indemnity. Rather, it 
provides a statutory vehicle, authorized by the Utah Legislature, for the State to directly 
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recover cleanup costs. The Court's analysis of the State's argument need not proceed 
further. 
However, even if the substance of the argument is reviewed, indemnity has no 
place in this case. Common law indemnity in the tort context typically arises when an 
innocent party is legally obligated to pay for the damages suffered by a victim whose 
injuries are entirely attributable to the wrongdoing of a third party tortfeasor. See 
generally Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Remedies § 3.10(3). 
In actions for indemnity, courts universally require proof of 
three elements: (1) the payor (prospective indemnitee) must 
discharge a legal obligation the payor owes to a third person; 
(2) the prospective indemnitor must also be liable to the third 
person; and (3) as between the claimant payor and the 
prospective indemnitor, the obligation ought to be discharged 
by the indemnitor. 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984) (emphasis 
added) (citing Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. v. Indian Head Cattle Co., 627 P.2d 469, 475 (Or. 
1981). The State's claim involves no third party victim that would create a situation 
analogous to common law indemnity. Rather the State's claim is for direct cost recovery 
of its own discretionary expenditures under the UST Act. If the State can avoid the 
statute of limitations by masquerading its claim as common law indemnification, it 
appears that almost any type of claim, based in tort, contract, or statute, can be similarly 
tortured to avoid the statute of limitations. Accordingly, common law indemnity has no 
bearing on the State's claims. 
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2. The State's Claim Against Marathon Is Based upon Subrogation 
Not Indemnification 
If indeed this Court chooses to analogize this matter to common law claims, the 
State's cost recovery action against Marathon is more accurately based on subrogation, 
which places the State in the shoes of a party with a property interest in the Site, and 
subjects the State to the same limitations as that party. Accordingly, the statute of 
limitations has run for all claims against Marathon. 
The UST Act expressly characterizes the State's claim as one based upon 
subrogation. The UST Act states: "If any payment is made under this part, the fund2 shall 
be subrogated to all the responsible parties' rights of recovery against any person or 
organization..." Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-426(7) (1998) (footnote added). The State's 
First Amended Complaint alleges that "funds have been expended from 1) appropriated 
excess funds from the Petroleum Storage Tank ("PST") Fund which was created by Utah 
Code Ann. § 19-6-409 and has been administered under authority of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 19-6-420, and 2) the Leaking Underground Storage Tank ("LUST") Trust Fund " 
(R. at 120.) The State seeks recovery of "all expenditures from the Lust [sic] Trust and 
PST Funds that have been and will in the future be made " (R. at 121.) 
2
 "'Fund' means the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund created in Section 19-6-409." 
Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-402(15) (1997). 
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Accordingly, as a subrogee, the State is treated no differently for statute of 
limitations purposes than any private party seeking cost allocation under the UST Act. 
As described above, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time contamination 
is discovered and a party knows it will be required to pay for cleanup. The State had 
mobilized its own investigation and cleanup of the Site by early 1995. This activity starts 
the statute of limitations. The State is not eligible for any exceptions from the rule that 
the statute of limitations accrues with the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
action as it is in the same position as the private party subrogor. 
II. ADDITIONALLY, UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UST ACT, 
THE STATE'S CLAIM ACCRUED ON MARCH 18, 1993 WHEN THE 
STATE DETERMINED THAT THE SITE OWNER WAS UNWILLING OR 
UNABLE TO CLEAN UP THE SITE 
Additionally, under the explicit language of the UST Act, the State's claim is time 
barred three years after the State determined that the Site owner was unwilling or unable 
to clean up the Site. 
The State's claim is based entirely on the UST Act. The UST Act authorizes the 
State to order private parties to investigate and remediate releases from tanks. Utah Code 
3
 Brent Redd entered into an indemnity agreement with Husky Oil Company, Marathon's 
predecessor, when he purchased the Site in 1984. (See Redd Depo. R. 902, Exhibit 6.) 
In the indemnity agreement Brent Redd "assumes all responsibility and liability of 
whatsoever kind. . . " from Husky Oil Company. By stepping into the shoes of Brent 
Redd, the State is also limited by the indemnity agreement, which bars any claim for cost 
allocation against Husky and Marathon. See, e.g., Howard P. Foley Co. v. Employers-
Commercial Union, 488 P.2d 987, 989 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the subrogor is 
subject to the same limitations and obligations as the subrogee). 
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Ann. § 19-6-420 (1998). The State is also authorized to initiate legal proceedings to 
allocate liability and recover past and future costs related to investigation and cleanup of 
the tanks. Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-420 and 19-6-424.5 (1998). Specifically, the UST 
Act states: 
(2) Regardless of whether the tank generating the release 
is covered by the fund, the executive secretary may: 
(a) order the owner or operator to take abatement, 
investigative, or corrective action, including the submission 
of a corrective action plan; and 
(b) if the owner or operator fails to take any of 
the abatement, investigative, or corrective action ordered 
by the executive secretary, the executive secretary may 
take any one or more of the following actions: 
(i) subject to the conditions in this part, use 
monies from the fund, if the tank involved is covered by the 
fund, state cleanup appropriation, or the Petroleum Storage 
Tank Cleanup Fund created under Section 19-6-405.7 to 
perform investigative, abatement, or corrective action; 
(ii) commence an enforcement proceeding; 
(iii) enter into agreements or is sue orders as 
allowed by Section 19-6-424.5; or 
(iv) recover costs from responsible parties 
equal to their proportionate share of liability as 
determined by Section 19-6-424.5. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 19-6-420(2) (1998) (emphasis added). 
It is important to note that by linking the State's alternative courses of action with 
"or," the UST Act authorizes the State to initiate its cause of action as soon as the owner 
fails to take any action ordered by the State. The allocation provisions of the UST Act 
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focus on liability, not previously incurred response costs. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
424.5(2) (1998). If the UST Act required the State to meet some threshold of expenditure 
prior to pursuing an allocation claim under § 19-6-424.5, the Utah Legislature would 
have included such language.4 Furthermore, if the UST Act only allowed the State to 
pursue liability allocation upon past expenditures, all of the State's claims in this case for 
future costs would be premature. Accordingly, the State's cause of action under the UST 
Act accrues as soon as the "owner or operator fails to take any of the . . . action ordered 
by the executive secretary [plaintiff]," and the three-year statute of limitations begins to 
run. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420(2) (1998). 
On March 18, 1993, the State sent a letter to Brent Redd stating that his "failure to 
comply with the requirements of the [UST A c t ] . . . may result in the issuance of a notice 
of agency action or order and the assessment of a civil penalty." (R. at 543.) The State 
also stated that he would "be subject to cost recovery of all funds expended by the State 
of Utah." (R. at 543.) For several years leading up to this letter, the State had repeatedly 
requested that Brent Redd clean up the Site. (R. at 462.) In 1991, the State also 
requested that defendant Woody's Enterprises clean up the Site. In that request, the State 
provided an extensive description of what was required for the cleanup. (R. at 462.) The 
State repeatedly contacted defendants Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd, each time 
Other jurisdictions have specified when the cost recovery action accrues. Mass. Ann. 
Laws ch. 2IE, § 11A (1992). Utah could have adopted similar language and modeled a 
statute of limitations provision after such a statute, however, the legislature elected to 
remain silent as to this issue. 
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demanding that they clean up the Site. (R. at 462.) Brent Redd replied to the State that 
he was unwilling or unable to clean up the Site. Redd Depo. (R. 902 at p. 147). The 
State expressly told Brent Redd that in light of his violations of the UST Act "the 
Executive Secretary (UST) has the authority to seek a civil penalty of up to $10,000.00 
for each day of violation of the [UST] Act..." (R. at 543.) Based on these facts and the 
State's extensive knowledge of the Site's conditions and risks, the State's cause of action 
began to accrue at this point under Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420(2), which explicitly 
provides for allocation of past and future cleanup costs among responsible parties if the 
owner fails to clean up the Site. 
By the State's own words expressed in its correspondence with Brent Redd 
regarding his "failure to comply with the requirements of the [UST Act]," the State's 
cause of action accrued no later than this date, meaning that the statute of limitations ran 
for this case on March 18, 1996. The State has no reason for its lengthy delay in filing its 
claims. All elements necessary for plaintiffs' cause of action—a leaking tank, the need 
for cleanup, and failure of the Site owner to clean up the Site as requested by the State— 
occurred by Spring of 1993 at the latest. The language of the UST Act requires nothing 
else for the State's cause of action. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420(2) (1998). 
This Court has held that when the legislature plainly articulates the elements of a 
cause of action created expressly by statute, no additional requirements can be construed 
as necessary for the cause of action to accrue. Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 
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1996). To impose additional requirements would contradict the legislative intent of what 
is necessary for a cause of action to accrue. Gohler, 919 P.2d at 563. In this case, the 
UST Act does not require the State to perform cleanup activities prior to initiating a cost 
allocation proceeding against potentially responsible parties. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
420(2)(b) (1998). Accordingly, the State's action accrued no later than the Spring of 
1993, upon the failure of the Site owner to clean up the Site as required by the State. 
There are no grounds in the UST Act for imposing additional requirements for the cause 
of action to accrue or to delay the statute of limitations. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT COMPORT WITH THE 
PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The result of the trial court's ruling is readily apparent in the facts of this case. If 
the trial court's ruling is allowed to stand, sites such as this one will be ignored or 
suppressed for long periods of time, five, ten, perhaps even twenty years. Pursuant to the 
trial court's ruling as it currently stands, by simply spending a little more money, a party 
can indefinitely extend any dispute under the UST Act. The remedial intent of the UST 
Act will be lost and petroleum releases will be uncontrolled while parties, including the 
State, can delay action on contaminated sites. Furthermore, parties such as Marathon are 
prejudiced by the loss of evidence and witnesses that would allow them to prove that 
their proportionate share of liability is much lower than what is allocated to them once 
evidence has been lost and memories have faded. 
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However, if the trial court's ruling is corrected to recognize the rule that the cause 
of action accrues under the UST Act when the State—or a private party—determines that 
it will be required to initiate cleanup, gasoline releases will be cleaned up in a timely 
fashion and cost allocation claims will be predictably filed within several years of a 
gasoline release. Such a rule would not preclude a party from recovering its costs under 
the UST Act—it simply requires parties to be timely in their assessment of the Site. 
Another benefit of such a rule is the earlier notification of potentially responsible parties. 
This increases the potential for settlement and efficient allocation of costs without further 
burdening the courts with complicated disputes over historical operations and liability. 
While the effects of statutes of limitations are occasionally unpalatable, it is a 
time-honored maxim that without their protection, parties would be exposed to stale 
claims and surprise litigation. Under Utah law, many plaintiffs who bear no 
responsibility for their injuries are regularly barred from pursuing claims they have 
waited too long to file. For example, in most cases victims of medical malpractice cannot 
pursue their claims more than four years after the date of the alleged malpractice, even if 
they are unaware of their injury. Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4(1) (1996). Moreover, 
wrongful death claims must be filed within two years of the decedent's death. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-28(2) (Supp. 2001). The State's claims enjoy no special protection either. 
This Court has faced other difficult statute of limitations cases in the past and held that 
Utah's statutes of limitations must bar claims that have been allowed to lapse. See, e.g., 
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Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) (denying claim of 
employee for conversion by employer of patented discovery). In some cases these claims 
involve individuals who did not fully understand their rights or the extent of the injury 
they had suffered. See United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 
880, 890 (Utah 1993). 
Regardless of the State's assertions that it would be unfair for it to bear the 
cleanup costs for the Site, the State has had full control over the timing and nature of the 
cleanup action. The State's control over this site and the State's extraordinary delay has 
cost Marathon its ability to conduct adequate discovery in this case and compromised 
efforts at determining a fair allocation of liability. Considering that the statute of 
limitations is intended to apply equally to private parties and the government, it is 
manifestly unjust to burden Marathon with the result of the State's delay. 
Furthermore, allowing the State's claim in this case will only open the door to 
future cost allocation claims from the State and private parties that are based upon facts 
even older and more obscured by time. Accordingly, the statute of limitations must be 
evenly applied. Failure to uniformly apply the statute of limitations would jeopardize the 
legal system by overwhelming it with stale demands. See United States v. Brockamp, 
519 U.S. 347, 353 (1997). 
The United States Supreme Court has summarized the necessity for a strong rule 
on statutes of limitations as follows: 
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On many prior occasions, we have emphasized the 
importance of the policies underlying state statutes of 
limitations. Statutes of limitations are not simply 
technicalities. To the contrary, they have long been respected 
as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system. Making out 
the substantive elements of a claim for relief involves a 
process of pleading, discovery, and trial. The process of 
discovery and trial which results in the finding of ultimate 
facts for or against the plaintiff by the judge or jury is 
obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony in 
question is relatively fresh. Thus in the judgment of most 
legislatures and courts, there comes a point at which the delay 
of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely either to 
impair the accuracy of the fact-finding process or to upset 
settled expectations that a substantive claim will be barred 
without respect to whether it is meritorious. 
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (emphasis added). This Court 
should hold similarly and apply the statute of limitations to the State's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court improperly held that the statute of limitations was triggered only 
when the State made a cleanup cost payment. Such a ruling vitiates the policy behind the 
statute of limitations and rewards the State for delay. This Court should reverse the trial 
court's order and conclude that the State is precluded from recovering any cleanup costs 
because it did not file its action within three years of the date its claims accrued. 
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DATED this [O day of August, 2001. 
DAVID W. TUNDIRMANN 
J. MICHAEL BAILEY 
RICHARD J. ANGELL 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Marathon Oil Company 
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Summary Judgment 
6. Utah Underground Storage Tank Act 
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Tabl 
EXHIBIT 1 
COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL ACCRUAL DATES TO THE 
STATE'S ACTUAL FILING DATE OF SEPTEMBER 16,1998 
Event that Arguably 
Triggered Accrual of the 
State's Claims 
Brent Redd informs the State 
that he is unable to cleanup the 
Site. 
State advises Brent Redd that 
his "failure to comply" with the 
UST Act could result in 
liability under the UST Act. 
State determines that it will 
perform its own cleanup of the 
Site as Brent Redd will not 
cleanup the Site himself. 
State obtains funding for 
cleanup at the Site and seeks 
access to the Site from Brent 
Redd. 
State contractors begin cleanup 
and investigation at the Site. 
Contractor invoices State for 
investigation and cleanup at the 
Date that Event 
Occurred Which 
Arguably Triggered 
Accrual of the 
State's Claims 
November 13, 1992 
March 18, 1993 (letter) 
August 3, 1994 
(internal 
memorandum) 
April 13, 1995 (letter) 
April 18, 1995 
(invoice) 
April 30,1995 
(invoices) 
Date that the 
Statute of 
Limitations 
Terminated the 
State's Claims 
November 13, 1995 
March 18, 1996 
August 3, 1997 
April 13, 1998 
April 18,1998 
April 30,1998 
Record 
Cite 
Redd Depo. 
R. at 902 at 
p. 147. 
R. at 542-44 
R. at 550-51 
R. at 553 
R. at 555-56 
R. at 555 
421481 1 
Event that Arguably 
Triggered Accrual of the 
State's Claims 
; Site. 
State accounting records show 
! cost disbursements related to 
the Site. 
State approves first contractor 
invoice for payment of Site 
I investigation and cleanup costs. 
! State pays first contractor 
1 invoice for Site investigation 
and cleanup costs. 
Each payment, regardless of 
how long overdue, creates a 
1 separate cause of action and 
with it, a separate statute of 
limitations. 
Date that Event 
Occurred Which 
Arguably Triggered 
Accrual of the 
State's Claims 
(invoices) 
May 5, 1995 (state 
accounting records) 
June 4, 1995 (invoice) 
June 21, 1995 (state 
accounting records) 
Variable 
(Trial Court Ruling) 
Date that the 
Statute of 
Limitations 
Terminated the 
State's Claims 
May 5, 1998 
June 4, 1998 
June 21, 1998 
Variable 
Record 
Cite 
R. at 591-
617 
R. at 555 
R. at 592 
R. at 816 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION; 
and KENT GRAY, Executive Secretary 
of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Board, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS 
K BRENT REDD, SHERRUX JEAN 
REDD, WOODY'S ENTERPRISES 
LTD, BILL C BUHLER, 
MARATHON OIL COMPANY and 
SHELL OIL COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Marathon Oil Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that the 
plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the three year statute of limitations set forth in UCA 78-12-
26(4) The plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to which the defendant filed a Reply 
Memorandum Oral argument was heard on March 31, 2000, and the court took the matter under 
advisement and now issues this ruling 
The plaintiff urges the court to rule that (1) all elements of plaintiffs' cause of action 
accrued well outside the 3 year statute of limitations, and (2) the cause of action accrued in this 
case upon the failure of the Site's current owners and operators to conduct investigation and 
cleanup required by plaintiffs pursuant to the Underground Storage Tank Act. The plaintiffs 
claim that a new cause of action accrues upon each payment of cleanup costs made by the 
plaintiffs with recovery being limited to costs incurred during the three years immediately prior 
to the filing of the complaint. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT 
MARATHON OIL COMPANY'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 9807-167 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The court rejects the defendant's theory as to when the cause of action occurred and is 
persuaded that the plaintiffs' cause of action in this case accrued when a cleanup cost payment 
was made by the plaintiffs. Because the complaint was filed in this case on August 12, 1998, the 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost payments made by plaintiffs 
more than 3 years prior to the filing of the complaint. Accordingly, the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost payments made by the plaintiffs more than 
three years prior to the filing of the complaint on August 12, 1998. 
DATED this pO day of May, 2000. 
c ^ 
r^ce K. Bryner, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980700167 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail J MICHAEL BAILEY 
ATTORNEY 
201 S. MAIN, STE 1800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail BRENT E JOHNSON 
ATTORNEY 
HOLLAND Sc HART 
60 E. South Temple, Ste 2000 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-1031 
Mail FRED R. SILVESTER 
ATTORNEY 
230 S 5th E, STE 590 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
Mail PAUL MCCONKIE 
ATTY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E. 300 S., 5TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114 
Mail TODD D. WEILER 
ATTY 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
60 E. SOUTH TEMPLE, ST 1270 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this _[P day of mJ^WV
 20 Ob . 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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RLEH 
; L E ^ ,• ; 
DAVID W. TUNDERMANN (3897) 
J. MICHAEL BAILEY (4965) 
RICHARD J. ANGELL (7460) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Marathon Oil Company 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, DIVISION 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE AND 
REMEDIATION; and KENT GRAY 
Executive Secretary of the Utah and 
Hazardous Waste Control Board, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
K. BRENT REDD, et al., 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER ON MARATHON OIL 
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil Case No. 9807-167 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
* * * * * * * 
The Court having considered the pleadings of the parties and relevant law and oral 
arguments, and pursuant to and consistent with the Court's Memorandum Decision filed October 
369288 1 
3, 2000, pertaining to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Marathon Oil 
Company, hereby enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court rejects the defendant's theory as to when the cause of action 
occurred and is persuaded that the plaintiffs' cause of action in this case accrued when a cleanup 
cost payment was made by the plaintiffs. 
2. Because the Complaint was filed in this case on September 16, 1998, the 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost payments made by plaintiffs 
more than 3 years prior to the filing of the complaint. 
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court enters the following 
Order: 
ORDER 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost 
payments made by the plaintiffs more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint on 
September 16, 1998. 2 
DATED this / / day of November, 2000. 
,THE COURT 
Approved as to form: " ^ ^ ^ ^ S e v e r a l District Court 
Paul M. McConkie, A s s i s t a n t 
3£9t?!orney General for P l a i n t i f f s 
I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
day of January, 2 0 01, 
mailed a true and correct copy of the attached document to the 
following: 
Paul M. McConkie, Esq. 
Utah Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 
Todd D. Weiler, Esq. 
Parry, Anderson & Mansfield 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1270 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David Tundermann, Esq. 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South M a m Street #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Brent Johnson 
Holland & Hart 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1031 
Fred Silvester 
Silvester & Conroy 
230 South 5tp East, Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
\mC) 
Margo Yufoafc,(Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FORc DEFUT^ 
SAN J U A N C O U N T Y , STATE OF U T A H 
U T A H D E P A R T M E N T OF 
E N V I R O N M E N T A L QUALITY, 
DIVISION OF E N V I R O N M E N T A L 
R E S P O N S E A N D REMEDIATION; 
and K E N T GRAY, Executive Secretary 
of the Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste 
Board, 
Plaintiffs, 
V S . 
K B R E N T REDD, SHERRJLL JEAN 
REDD, W O O D Y ' S ENTERPRISES 
LTD., BILL C. BUHLER, 
M A R A T H O N OIL C O M P A N Y and 
SHELL OIL C O M P A N Y , 
Defendants. 
The defendants Redd and W o o d y ' s Enterprises (hereinafter the "defendants") filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgement alleging that the plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the three year 
statute of limitations set forth in U C A 78-12-26(4). The plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition and a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition together with an affidavit of Randy 
Gordon. A Reply Memorandum and a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon were 
filed by the defendants . Oral argument was heard on March 3 1 , 2000, and the court took the 
matter under advisement. The court has considered the memorandum, the arguments of counsel, 
and the law and now issues this ruling. 
RULING ON D E F E N D A N T K. B R E N T 
R E D D A N D W O O D Y ' S ENTERPRISES 
L T D ' S M O T I O N FOR S U M M A R Y 
J U D G M E N T , and R U L I N G ON M O T I O N 
T O STRIKE T H E AFFIDAVIT OF 
R A N D Y G O R D O N 
Civil No . 9807-167 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
I. The Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon 
The defendants filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon and a 
Memorandum in Support dated January 21st, 2000, which claim that the affidavit is hearsay and 
is not the best evidence of when the DEQ first incurred any costs. The plaintiffs responded by 
filing a Response dated February 2, 2000, and a supplemental affidavit of Randy Gordon 
together with an accompanying data base spread sheet for the purpose of correcting the alleged 
deficiencies. The defendants filed a Reply Memorandum dated February 9, 2000, which requests 
that the multiple affidavits be stricken " . . . because DEQ has still failed to provide any adequate 
foundation for the affidavit or any indicia of its authenticity..." 
The defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Randy Gordon is granted for the reason 
that the data base entries attached to the supplemental affidavit, which are summaries of the 
business records, are not the business records themselves. Although a summary may be 
admissible if the actual records themselves are made available for inspection, there is nothing in 
the record to show that the plaintiffs have met their burden of making the records themselves, 
i.e., invoices, receipts submitted from contract providers, and in house receipts and time logs as 
set forth in paragraph 6 of the supplemental affidavit, available for examination to the 
satisfaction of the defendants. The court therefore finds that the foundational requirements of 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006, have not been met and the summary (data base spread sheet) 
is inadmissible and the affidavit is therefore hearsay . 
II. The Motion for Summary Judgment 
It is undisputed in the parties' memorandum that the statute of limitations in this instance 
is three years, that the three year period ". . . begins to run when the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action occurs," and that the complaint was filed on August 12, 1998. 
A. The Issue Presented 
The issue before this court is: When did the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
action occurr? 
B. Positions of the Parties 
The defendants contend that plaintiffs complaint sounds in subrogation, not 
indemnification, and that the cause of action was complete on August 12, 1994, when DEQ sent 
a letter to the Redd defendants, confirming them as the owners of a facility containing leaking 
underground storage tanks which were the cause of soil and ground water contamination. The 
defendants also claim that the cause of action in a subrogation case accrues at the time of injury, 
not at the time of payment. (Underlining added). The defendants further assert that because the 
plaintiffs knew of the injury to the property by August 12, 1994, if not sooner, the complaint 
should have been filed within three years thereafter. 
The plaintiffs contend that this is a statutory indemnification case and that the cause of 
action was not complete until the plaintiffs made a payment on the underlying claim. The 
plaintiffs further contend that UCA 78-12-26(4) provides for the accrual of a cause of action at 
the time each payment is made by plaintiffs. 
C. Ruling 
The Utah Appellate Courts have not addressed the issue of when the statute of 
limitations begins to run in the context of a LUST cast. Absent such authority, the court is 
persuaded that the law of indemnification applies and that the last act necessary to complete a 
cause of action occurs when a cleanup cost payment is made by the plaintiffs. The court also 
finds that each payment is the accrual of a new cause of action under UCA 78-12-26(4). The 
court limits these claims, however, to the costs actually paid within the three years immediately 
preceding the filing of the complaint. 
Because the complaint was filed on August 12, 1998, the Motion for Summary Judgment 
is denied as to any cleanup costs paid by plaintiffs before August 12, 1995. Plaintiffs counsel is 
directed to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling 
DATED this ^-° day of May, 2000. 
T3ryce K. Bryner, Judge 
c 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980700167 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail J MICHAEL BAILEY 
ATTORNEY 
201 S. MAIN, STE 1800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail BRENT E JOHNSON 
ATTORNEY 
HOLLAND & HART 
60 E. South Temple, Ste 2000 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111-1031 
Mail FRED R. SILVESTER 
ATTORNEY 
230 S 5th E, STE 590 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
Mail PAUL MCCONKIE 
ATTY 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E. 300 S., 5TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114 
Mail TODD D. WEILER 
ATTY 
PARRY ANDERSON & MANSFIELD 
60 E. SOUTH TEMPLE, ST 1270 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this j I day of ^ djlyys , 20 ^D 
Deputy Cou^rt C l e r k 
Page 1 ( l a s t ) 
Tab 5 
c
. r / ' z f 
PAUL MMcCONKIE (Utah Bar No. 5881) 
Assistant Attorney General ^;. 
JAN GRAHAM (Utah Bar No. 1231) p • —."_ . - .. _ 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
160 East 300 South, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0873 
Telephone: (801)366-0236 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, DIVISION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSE AND REMEDIATION; and KENT 
GRAY Executive Secretary of the Utah 
and Hazardous Waste Control Board, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
K. BRENT REDD, et al. 
Defendants, 
The Court having considered the pleadings of the parties and relevant law and oral 
arguments, and pursuant to and consistent with the Court's Memorandum Decision filed October 
3, 2000, pertaining to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants K. Brent Redd and 
Woody's Enterprises, Ltd., hereby enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court rejects the defendant's theory as to when the cause of action 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER ON K. BRENT 
REDD AND WOODY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 9807-167 
occurred and is persuaded that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued when a cleanup cost 
payment was made by the plaintiffs. 
2. Because the Complaint was filed in this case on September 16, 1998, the 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost payments made by plaintiffs 
more than 3 years prior to the filing of the complaint 
Based upon the foregoing Conclusions of Law, the Court enters the following 
Order: 
ORDER 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to any cleanup cost 
payments made by the plaintiffs more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint on 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the (fs{f day of January, 2001, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the attached document to the 
following: 
Paul M. McConkie, Esq. 
Utah Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140873 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873 
Todd D. Weiler, Esq. 
Parry, Anderson & Mansfield 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1270 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David Tundermann, Esq. 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Brent Johnson 
Holland & Hart 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1031 
Fred Silvester 
Silvester & Conroy 
230 South 5^ h East, Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Margo Yuh 
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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 19-6-401 
(2) (a) The executive director may receive funds from any responsible party 
that signs a voluntary agreement allowing the executive director to: 
(i) review any proposals outlining how the investigation or cleanup 
action is to be performed; and 
(ii) oversee the investigation or cleanup action, 
(b) Funds received by the executive director under this section shall be 
deposited in the fund and used by the executive director as provided in the 
voluntary agreement. 
(3) If a responsible party fails to perform as required under a voluntary 
agreement entered into under this part, the executive director may take action 
and seek penalties to enforce the agreement as provided in the agreement. 
(4) The executive director may not use the provisions of Section 19-6-310, 
19-6-316, or 19-6-318 to recover costs received or expended pursuant to a 
voluntary agreement from any person not a party to that agreement. 
(5) (a) Any party who incurs costs under a voluntary agreement in excess of 
his liability may seek contribution from any other party who is or may be 
liable under this part for the excess costs in district court. 
(b) In resolving claims made under Subsection (5)(a), the court shall 
allocate costs using the standards in Subsection 19-6-310(2). 
(6) This section takes precedence over conflicting provisions in this chapter 
regarding agreements with responsible parties to conduct an investigation or 
cleanup action. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14d-901, enacted by renumbered, but this section was renumbered 
L. 1991, ch. 194, § 4; renumbered as 19-6- as § 19-6-325 by the Office of Legislative Re-
322 by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 242; recodified as search and General Counsel because of the 
19-6-325. creation by ch. 112 of another § 19-6-322. 
Compiler's Notes. — This section was en- Laws 1991, ch. 112, § 242(10)(c) directs that 
acted as § 26-14d-901; L. 1991, ch. 112, § 242 "executive" be inserted before "director" 
directed that this section be renumbered as throughout. 
§ 19-6-322 and that the internal references be 
PART 4 
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK ACT 
Sunset Act. — See Section 63-55-219 for the repeal date of this part. 
19-6-401. Short title. 
This part is known as the "Underground Storage Tank Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-101, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 2; renumbered by L. 
1991, ch. 112, § 170. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments AX.R. — State and local government control 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — of pollution from underground storage tanks, 
Environmental Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 236. 11 A.L.R.5th 388. 
19-6-402 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CODE 
19-6-402. Definitions, 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Abatement action" means action taken to limit, reduce, mitigate, or 
eliminate a release from an xmderground storage tank or petroleum 
storage tank, or to limit or reduce, mitigate, or eliminate the damage 
caused by that release. 
(2) "Board" means the Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
created in Section 19-1-106. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means bodily harm, sickness, disease, or death 
sustained by any person. 
(4) "Certificate of compliance" means a certificate issued to a facility by 
the executive secretary: 
(a) demonstrating that an owner or operator of a facility containing 
one or more petroleum storage tanks has met the requirements of this 
part; and 
(b) listing all tanks at the facility, specifying which tanks may 
receive petroleum and which tanks have not met the requirements for 
compliance. 
(5) "Certificate of registration" means a certificate issued to a facility by 
the executive secretary demonstrating that an owner or operator of a 
facility containing one or more underground storage tanks has: 
(a) registered the tanks; and 
(b) paid the annual underground storage tank fee. 
(6) (a) "Certified underground storage tank consultant" means any 
person who: 
(i) meets the education and experience standards established 
by the board under Subsection 19-6-403(l)(a)(vi) in order to 
provide or contract to provide information, opinions, or advice 
relating to underground storage tank management, release 
abatement, investigation, corrective action, or evaluation for a 
fee, or in connection with the services for which a fee is charged; 
and 
(ii) has submitted an application to the board and received a 
written statement of certification from the board, 
(b) "Certified underground storage tank consultant" does not in-
clude: 
(i) an employee of the owner or operator of the underground 
storage tank, or an employee of a business operation that has a 
business relationship with the owner or operator of the under-
ground storage tank, and that markets petroleum products or 
manages underground storage tanks; or 
(ii) persons licensed to practice law in this state who offer only 
legal advice on underground storage tank management, release 
abatement, investigation, corrective action, or evaluation. 
(7) "Closed" means an underground storage tank no longer in use that 
has been: 
(a) emptied and cleaned to remove all liquids and accumulated 
sludges; and 
(b) either removed from the ground or filled with an inert solid 
material. 
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 19-6-402 
(8) "Corrective action plan" means a plan for correcting a release from 
a petroleum storage tank that includes provisions for all or any of the 
following: 
(a) cleanup or removal of the release; 
(b) containment or isolation of the release; 
(c) treatment of the release; 
(d) correction of the cause of the release; 
(e) monitoring and maintenance of the site of the release; 
(f) provision of alternative water supplies to persons whose drink-
ing water has become contaminated by the release; or 
(g) temporary or permanent relocation, whichever is determined by 
the executive secretary to be more cost-effective, of persons whose 
dwellings have been determined by the executive secretary to be no 
longer habitable due to the release. 
(9) "Costs" means any monies expended for: 
(a) investigation; 
(b) abatement action; 
(c) corrective action; 
(d) judgments, awards, and settlements for bodily injury or prop-
erty damage to third parties; 
(e) legal and claims adjusting costs incurred by the state in 
connection with judgments, awards, or settlements for bodily injury or 
property damage to third parties; or 
(f) costs incurred by the state risk manager in determining the 
actuarial soundness of the fund. 
(10) "Covered by the fund" means the requirements of Section 19-6-424 
have been met. 
(11) "Dwelling" means a building that is usually occupied by a person 
lodging there at night. 
(12) "Enforcement proceedings" means a civil action or the procedures 
to enforce orders established by Section 19-6-425. 
(13) "Executive secretary" means the executive secretary of the board. 
(14) "Facility" means all underground storage tanks located on a single 
parcel of property or on any property adjacent or contiguous to that parcel. 
(15) "Fund" means the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund created in 
Section 19-6-409. 
(16) "Loan fund" means the Petroleum Storage Tank Loan Fund created 
in Section 19-6-405.3. 
(17) "Operator" means any person in control of or who is responsible on 
a daily basis for the maintenance of an underground storage tank that is 
in use for the storage, use, or dispensing of a regulated substance. 
(18) "Owner" means: 
(a) in the case of an underground storage tank in use on or after 
November 8, 1984, any person who owns an underground storage 
tank used for the storage, use, or dispensing of a regulated substance; 
and 
(b) in the case of any underground storage tank in use before 
November 8, 1984, but not in use on or after November 8, 1984, any 
person who owned the tank immediately before the discontinuance of 
its use for the storage, use, or dispensing of a regulated substance. 
19-6-402 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CODE 
(19) "Petroleum" includes crude oil or any fraction of crude oil that is 
liquid at 60 degrees Fahrenheit and at a pressure of 14.7 pounds per 
square inch absolute. 
(20) "Petroleum storage tank* means a tank that: 
(a) (i) is underground; 
(ii) is regulated under Subtitle I of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 6991c, et seq.; and 
(iii) contains petroleum; or 
(b) is a tank that the owner or operator voluntarily submits for 
participation in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund under 
Section 19-6-415. 
(21) "Petroleum Storage Tank Account" means the account created in 
Section 19-6-405.5. 
(22) "Program" means the Environmental Assurance Program under 
Section 19-6-410.5. 
(23) "Property damage" means physical injury to or destruction of 
tangible property including loss of use of that property. 
(24) "Regulated substance" means petroleum and petroleum-based sub-
stances comprised of a complex blend of hydrocarbons derived from crude 
oil through processes of separation, conversion, upgrading, and finishing, 
and includes motor fuels, jet fuels, distillate fuel oils, residual fuel oils, 
lubricants, petroleum solvents, and used oils. 
(25) "Release" means any spilling, leaking, emitting, discharging, es-
caping, leaching, or disposing from an underground storage tank or 
petroleum storage tank. The entire release is considered a single release. 
(26) (a) "Responsible party" means any person who: 
(i) is the owner or operator of a facility; 
(ii) owns or has legal or equitable title in a facility or an 
underground storage tank; 
(iii) owned or had legal or equitable title in the facility at the 
time any petroleum was received or contained at the facility; 
(iv) operated or otherwise controlled activities at the facility at 
the time any petroleum was received or contained at the facility; 
or 
(v) is an underground storage tank installation company. 
(b) "Responsible party" as defined in Subsections (26)(a)(i), (ii), and 
(iii) does not include: 
(i) any person who is not an operator and, without participat-
ing in the management of a facility and otherwise not engaged in 
petroleum production, refining, and marketing, holds indicia of 
ownership: 
(A) primarily to protect his security interest in the facility; 
or 
(B) as a fiduciary or custodian under Title 75, Uniform 
Probate Code, or under an employee benefit plan; or 
(ii) governmental ownership or control of property by involun-
tary transfers as provided in CERCLA Section 101(20)(D), 42 
U.S.C. Section 9601(20)(D). 
(c) The exemption created by Subsection (b)(i)(B) does not apply to 
actions taken by the state or its officials or agencies under this part. 
(d) The terms and activities "indicia of ownership," "primarily to 
protect a security interest," "participation in management," and 
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 19-6-402.5 
"foreclosure on property and postforeclosure activities," under this 
part shall be in accordance with 40 CFR 300.1100, National Contin-
gency Plan. 
(e) The terms "participation in management" and "indicia of own-
ership" as defined in 40 CFR 300.1100, National Contingency Plan, 
include and apply to the fiduciaries listed in Subsection (26)(b)(i)(B). 
(27) "Soil test" means a test, established or approved by board rule, to 
detect the presence of petroleum in soil. 
(28) "State cleanup appropriation" means the money appropriated by 
the Legislature to the department to fund the investigation, abatement, 
and corrective action regarding releases not covered by the fund. 
(29) "Underground storage tank" means any tank regulated under 
Subtitle I, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 
6991c, et seq., including: 
(a) a petroleum storage tank; 
(b) underground pipes and lines connected to a storage tank; and 
(c) any underground ancillary equipment and containment system. 
(30) "Underground storage tank installation company" means any per-
son, firm, partnership, corporation, governmental entity, association, or 
other organization who installs underground storage tanks. 
(31) "Underground storage tank installation company permit" means a 
permit issued to an underground storage tank installation company by the 
executive secretary. 
(32) "Underground storage tank technician" means a person employed 
by and acting under the direct supervision of a certified underground 
storage tank consultant to assist in carrying out the functions described in 
Subsection (6)(a). 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-102, enacted by deleted uto be eligible for payments of costs 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 3; 1990, ch. 301, § 1; from the fund regarding any release meeting 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 171; the requirements of Section 19-6-424" from the 
1992, ch. 30, § 49; 1992, ch. 214, § 1; 1992, end of Subsection (4)(a); inserted "Trust" in 
ch.280, § 6; 1993,ch. 240, § 2; 1994,ch. 297, Subsection (15); redesignated Subsection 
§ 1; 1996, ch. 79, § 27; 1997, ch. 172, § 1. (20)(a) as (20)(a)(i), redesignating former Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- sections (20)(b) and (20)(c) as (20)(a)(ii) and 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsections (20)(a)(iii), and added Subsection (20)(b); redes-
(6), (26), and (29) to (31), renumbering the other ignated former Subsection (28) as Subsection 
subsections accordingly; rewrote Subsection (21) and added Subsection (22), redesignating 
(16), which formerly defined "fund surplus"; subsections accordingly; in Subsection (21) sub-
and added Subsection (24)(a)(v), making re- stituted "Petroleum" for "Underground"; in 
lated changes. Subsection (28) deleted "under Section 19-6-
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 409" after "department" and "and not on the 
1996, deleted "and 40 CFR 300.1105, National national priority list as defined in Section 19-
Contingency Plan" from the end of Subsection 6-302" after "fund"; updated references in Sub-
(24)(b)(ii) and made a stylistic change. sections (6) and (26); and made stylistic 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, changes. 
19-6-402,5. Retroactive effect, 
(1) The Legislature finds the definitions in this part prior to the passage of 
this act did not clearly set forth procedures for identifying responsible parties 
and interfered with effective allocation of costs of cleanup as required by this 
part. 
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(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that this act provides clarification 
regarding procedures for allocating responsibility for the costs of investigation, 
abatement, and corrective action as required under this part. 
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature that this part imposes liability as 
determined under this part retroactively to any release of petroleum or any 
other regulated substance subject to investigation, abatement, or corrective 
action under this part. 
History: C. 1953,19-6-402.5, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 214, § 2. 
19-6-403. Powers and duties of board* 
(1) (a) The board shall regulate underground storage tanks and petroleum 
storage tanks by applying the provisions of this part and by making rules 
for: 
(i) certification of tank installers, inspectors, testers, and removers; 
(ii) registration of tanks; 
(iii) administration of the petroleum storage tank program; 
(iv) format and required information regarding records to be kept 
by tank owners or operators who are participating in the fund; 
(v) voluntary participation in the fund for above ground petroleum 
storage tanks and tanks exempt from regulation under 40 C.F.R., Part 
280, Subpart (B), and specified in Section 19-6-415; and 
(vi) certification of underground storage tank consultants, includ-
ing requirements for minimum education or experience, which rules 
shall recognize the educational background of a professional engineer 
licensed under Title 58, Chapter 22, Professional Engineers and Land 
Surveyors Licensing Act, as meeting the education requirements for 
certification, but shall require proof of experience that meets certifi-
cation requirements, 
(b) The board shall make rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, adopting requirements for 
underground storage tanks contained in Subtitle I of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 6991c, et seq., and other 
future applicable final federal regulations. 
(2) The board shall ensure that the rules made under the authority of 
Subsection (1) meet federal requirements for the state's assumption of primacy 
in the regulation of underground storage tanks, as provided in Section 9004 of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 6991c, et seq. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-201, enacted by (l)(a)(v) and made related changes. 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 4; renumbered by L. The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
1991, ch. 112, § 172; 1994, ch. 297, § 2; 1997, added Subsection (D(aXiv), redesignating sub-
ch. 172, § 2. sections accordingly, and in Subsection (l)(a)(v) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- added "above ground petroleum storage tanks 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsection and." 
19-6-404. Powers and duties of executive secretary. 
(1) The executive secretary shall administer the petroleum storage tank 
program established in this part. 
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(2) As necessary to meet the requirements or carry out the purposes of this 
part, the executive secretary may: 
(a) advise, consult, and cooperate with other persons; 
(b) employ persons; 
(c) authorize a certified employee or a certified representative of the 
department to conduct facility inspections and reviews of records required 
to be kept by this part and by rules made under this part; 
(d) encourage, participate in, or conduct studies, investigation, re-
search, and demonstrations; 
(e) collect and disseminate information; 
(f) enforce rules made by the board and any requirement in this part by 
issuing notices and orders; 
(g) review plans, specifications, or other data; 
(h) represent the state in all matters pertaining to interstate under-
ground storage tank management and control, including, with the concur-
rence of the executive director, entering into interstate compacts and other 
similar agreements; 
(i) enter into contracts or agreements with political subdivisions for the 
performance of any of the department's responsibilities under this part if: 
(i) the contract or agreement is not prohibited by state or federal 
law and will not result in a loss of federal funding; and 
(ii) the executive secretary determines that: 
(A) the political subdivision is willing and able to satisfactorily 
discharge its responsibilities under the contract or agreement; 
and 
(B) the contract or agreement will be practical and effective; 
(j) take any necessary enforcement action authorized under this part; 
(k) require an owner or operator of an underground storage tank to: 
(i) furnish information or records relating to the tank, its equip-
ment, and contents; 
(ii) monitor, inspect, test, or sample the tank, its contents, and any 
surrounding soils, air, or water; or 
(iii) provide access to the tank at reasonable times; 
(1) take any abatement, investigative, or corrective action as authorized 
in this part; and 
(m) enter into agreements or issue orders to apportion percentages of 
liability of responsible parties under Section 19-6-424.5. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection 19-6-414(3), appeals of 
decisions made by the executive secretary under this part shall be made to the 
board. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-202, enacted by deleted "underground storage tank program 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 5; renumbered by Lu and" before "petroleum"; in Subsection (2)(c) 
1991, ch. 112, § 173; 1992, ch. 214, § 3; 1997, substituted the language beginning "facility 
ch. 172, § 3. inspections and" for "inspections"; and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- one stylistic change, 
ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection (1) 
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19-6-405. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1992, ch. 280, § 62 repeals reports, and information, effective July 1,1992. 
this section, as last amended by L. 1991, ch. For comparable provisions, see Title 63, Chap-
112, § 174, relating to availability of records, ter 2. 
19-6-405.3. Creation of Petroleum Storage Tank Loan 
Fund — Purposes — Loan eligibility — Loan 
restrictions — Rulemaking. 
(1) There is created the revolving loan fund entitled the Petroleum Storage 
Tank Loan Fund. 
(2) The sources of monies for the loan fund are: 
(a) appropriations to the loan fund; 
(b) principal and interest received from the repayment of loans made by 
the executive secretary under Subsection (3); and 
(c) all investment income derived from money in the fund. 
(3) The executive secretary may loan, in accordance with this section, 
monies available in the loan fund to persons to be used for: 
(a) upgrading petroleum storage tanks and associated piping with 
corrosion protection, or spill and overfill prevention equipment as neces-
sary to meet the federal deadline required under 40 CFR 280.21; 
(b) replacing underground storage tanks; or 
(c) permanently closing underground storage tanks. 
(4) A person may apply to the executive secretary for a loan under Subsec-
tion (3) if all tanks owned or operated by that person are in substantial 
compliance with all state and federal requirements or will be brought into 
substantial compliance using money from the loan fund. 
(5) The executive secretary shall consider loan applications under Subsec-
tion (4) to meet the following objectives: 
(a) support availability of gasoline in rural parts of the state; 
(b) support small businesses; and 
(c) reduce the threat of a petroleum release endangering the environ-
ment. 
(6) Loans made under this section shall: 
(a) be for no more than $45,000 for all tanks at any one facility; 
(b) be for no more than $15,000 per tank; 
(c) be for no more than 80% of the total cost of: 
(i) upgrading a tank and associated piping to meet requirements of 
40 CFR 280.21; 
(ii) replacing the underground storage tank; or 
(iii) permanently closing the underground storage tank; 
(d) have a fixed annual interest rate of 3%; 
(e) have a term no longer than ten years; 
(f) be made on the condition the loan applicant obtains adequate 
security for the loan as established by board rule under Subsection (7); and 
(g) comply with rules made by the board under Subsection (7). 
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, the board shall make rules establishing: 
(a) form, content, and procedure for loan applications; 
(b) criteria and procedures for prioritizing loan applications; 
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(c) requirements and procedures for securing loans; 
(d) procedures for making the loans; 
(e) procedures for administering and ensuring repayment of loans, 
including late payment penalties; and 
(f) procedures for recovering on defaulted loans. 
(8) The decisions of the executive secretary in loaning money from the loan 
fund and otherwise administering the loan fund are not subject to Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(9) The Legislature shall appropriate monies for administration of the loan 
fund to the department from the loan fund. 
(10) The executive secretary may enter into agreements with public entities 
or private organizations to perform any tasks associated with administration 
of the loan fund. 
History: C. 1953,19-6-405.3, enacted by L. appropriates, for the fiscal year 1996-1997, 
1994, ch. 297, § 3- $2,000,000 from the Petroleum Storage Tank 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 297, Fund to the Petroleum Storage Tank Loan 
§ 16 makes the act effective on July 1, 1994. Fund. 
Appropriations. — Laws 1996, ch. 162, § 4 
19-6-405.5. Creation of restricted account. 
(1) There is created in the General Fund a restricted account known as the 
Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account. 
(2) All penalties and interest imposed under this part shall be deposited in 
this account, except as provided in Section 19-6-410.5. Specified program funds 
under this part that are unexpended at the end of the fiscal year lapse into this 
account. 
(3) The Legislature shall appropriate the money in the account to the 
department for the costs of administering the petroleum storage tank program 
under this part. 
History: C. 1953,19-6-405.5, enacted by L. The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, 
1992, ch- 214, § 4; 1997, ch. 172, § 4; 1998, in the first sentence of Subsection (2) inserted 
ch. 95, § 1. "and interest" near the beginning and "except 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- as provided in Section 19-6-410.5" at the end. 
ment, effective May 5, 1997, added the subsec- Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1997, ch. 172, 
tion designations; changed the name of the which amended this section, directs in § 25 that 
account, which had been "Underground Stor- all funds currently in the Underground Storage 
age Tank Account*; and substituted "petroleum" Tank Restricted Account be transferred to the 
for "underground" in Subsection (3). Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account. 
19-6-405.7. Petroleum Storage Tank Cleanup Fund — 
Revenue and purposes. 
(1) There is created an expendable trust fund entitled the Petroleum 
Storage Tank Cleanup Fund, which is referred to in this section as the cleanup 
fund. 
(2) The cleanup fund sources of revenue are: 
(a) any voluntary contributions received by the department for the 
cleanup of facilities; 
(b) legislative appropriations made to the cleanup fund; and 
(c) costs recovered under this part. 
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(3) The cleanup fund shall earn interest, which shall be deposited in the 
cleanup fund. 
(4) The executive secretary may use the cleanup fund monies for adminis-
tration, investigation, abatement action, and preparing and implementing a 
corrective action plan regarding releases not covered by the Petroleum Storage 
Tank Trust Fund created in Section 19-6-409. 
History: C. 1953,19-6-405,7, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 255, § ' 
1998, ch. 255, § 1. makes the act effective on July 1, 1998. 
19-6-406. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1992, ch. 214, § 26 repeals ment or corrective action for underground stor 
§ 19-6-406, as renumbered and amended by age tank release, effective April 27, 1992. Fo 
Laws 1991, ch. 112, § 175, relating to abate- present comparable provisions, see § 19-6-420 
19-6-407. Underground storage tank registration — 
Change of ownership or operation — Civil pen 
alty. 
(1) (a) Each owner or operator of an underground storage tank shal 
register the tank with the executive secretary if the tank: 
(i) is in use; or 
(ii) was closed after January 1, 1974. 
(b) If a new person assumes ownership or operational responsibilities 
for an underground storage tank, that person shall inform the executive 
secretary of the change within 30 days after the change occurs. 
(c) Each installer of an underground storage tank shall notify th< 
executive secretary of the completed installation within 60 days followinj 
the installation of an underground storage tank. 
(2) The executive secretary may issue a notice of agency action assessing 
civil penalty in the amount of $1,000 if an owner, operator, or installer, of 
petroleum or underground storage tank fails to register the tank or provid 
notice as required in Subsection (1). 
(3) The penalties collected under authority of this section shall be deposite 
in the Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account created in Section 19-6 
405.5. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-301, enacted by tor, or installer" for "or operator" and "or pr 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 9; renumbered by L. vide notice as required" for "as provided." 
1991, ch. 112, § 176; 1992, ch. 214, § 5; 1994, The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 199 
ch. 297, § 4; 1997, ch. 172, § 5. i n Subsection (3) substituted "Petroleum Sto 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- age Tank Restricted Account" for aUndergrour 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsection Storage Tank Account." 
(lXc) and in Subsection (2) substituted "opera-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"In use" construed. bons was "in use" and, therefore, subject 
Underground storage tank that contained regulation under this part. V-l Oil Co. v. E 
one to one and one-half inches of a substance partment of EnvtT Quality, 904 R2d 214 (Utj 
with detectable levels of petroleum hydrocar- Ct. App. 1995). 
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19-6-408. Underground storage tank registration fee — 
Processing fee for tanks not in the program. 
(1) The department may assess an annual underground storage tank 
registration fee against owners or operators of underground storage tanks that 
have not been closed. These fees shall be: 
(a) billed per facility; 
(b) due on July 1 annually; 
(c) deposited with the department as dedicated credits; 
(d) used by the department for the administration of the underground 
storage tank program outlined in this part; and 
(e) established under Section 63-38-3.2. 
(2) (a) In addition to the fee under Subsection (1), an owner or operator who 
elects to demonstrate financial assurance through a mechanism other 
than the Environmental Assurance Program shall pay a processing fee of: 
(i) for fiscal year 1997-98, $1,000 for each financial assurance 
mechanism document submitted to the division for review; and 
(ii) on and after July 1, 1998, a processing fee established under 
Section 63-38-3.2. 
(b) If a combination of financial assurance mechanisms is used to 
demonstrate financial assurance, the fee under Subsection (2)(a) shall be 
paid for each document submitted. 
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "financial assurance mechanism 
document" may be a single document that covers more than one facility 
through a single financial assurance mechanism. 
(3) Any funds provided for administration of the underground storage tank 
program under this section that are not expended at the end of the fiscal year 
lapse into the Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account created in Section 
19-6-405.5. 
(4) The executive secretary shall provide all owners or operators who pay 
the annual underground storage tank registration fee a certificate of registra-
tion. 
(5) (a) The executive secretary may issue a notice of agency action assessing 
a civil penalty of $1,000 per facility if an owner or operator of an 
underground storage tank facility fails to pay the required fee within 60 
days after the July 1 due date. 
(b) The registration fee and late payment penalty accrue interest at 
12% per annum. 
(c) If the registration fee, late payment penalty, and interest accrued 
under this subsection are not paid in full within 60 days after the July 1 
due date any certificate of compliance issued prior to the July 1 due date 
lapses. The executive secretary may not reissue the certificate of compli-
ance until full payment under this subsection is made to the department. 
(d) The executive secretary may waive any penalty assessed under this 
subsection if no fuel has been dispensed from the tank on or after July 1, 
1991. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-302, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 10; renumbered by L. 
1991, ch. 112, § 177; 1992, ch. 214, § 6; 1994, 
ch. 297, § 5; 1995, ch. 28, § 9; 1997, ch. 172, 
§ 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
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ment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsection 
(5)(d). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, 
substituted "63-38-3.2" for "63-38-3" in Subsec-
tion (3). 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, 
added Subsections (l)(e) and (2), making one 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-401, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 11; 1990, ch. 301, § 2; 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 178; 
1992, ch. 214, § 7; 1994, ch. 297, § 6; 1997, 
ch. 172, § 7; 1997, ch. 272, § 1; 1998, ch. 95, 
§ 2; 1998, ch. 255, § 2; 1998, ch. 417, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, added Subsection 
stylistic change; redesignated former Subsec-
tion (2) as (3), substituting "Petroleum Storage 
Tank Restricted Account" for "Underground 
Storage Tank Account"; and deleted former 
Subsection (3) which read: "In establishing 
fees, the department shall follow the proce-
dures of Section 63-38-3.2." 
(D(bXii), renumbering former Subsections 
(l)(b)(ii) and (iii) as Subsections (IXbXiii) and 
(iv); rewrote Subsection (5)(a) as present Sub-
section (5) and redesignated former Subsec-
tions (5Xb) and (c) as Subsection (6), making 
related internal designation and reference 
changes; and substituted "Subsections (3) and 
(5Xb)" for "this section" and inserted "or com-
19-6-409. Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund created — 
Source of revenues* 
(1) (a) There is created an expendable trust fund entitled the Petroleum 
Storage Tank Trust Fund. 
(b) The sole sources of revenues for the fund are: 
(i) petroleum storage tank fees under Section 19-6-411; 
(ii) underground storage tank installation company permit fees 
under Section 19-6-411; 
(iii) the environmental assurance fee and any penalties, paid under 
Section 19-6-410.5; and 
(iv) any interest accrued on these revenues. 
(c) Interest earned on fund monies shall be deposited into the fund. 
(2) Fund monies may be used to pay: 
(a) costs as provided in Section 19-6-419; and 
(b) for the administration of the fund and the environmental assurance 
program and fee under Section 19-6-410.5. 
(3) Costs for the administration of the fund and the environmental assur-
ance fee shall be appropriated by the Legislature. 
(4) The executive secretary may expend monies from the fund for: 
(a) legal and claims adjusting costs incurred by the state in connection 
with claims, judgments, awards, or settlements for bodily injury or 
property damage to third parties; 
(b) costs incurred by the state risk manager in determining the actu-
arial soundness of the fund; and 
(c) other costs as provided in this part. 
(5) For fiscal year 1997-98, money in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust 
Fund, up to a maximum of $2,200,000, may be appropriated by the Legislature 
to the department as nonlapsing funds to be applied to the costs of investiga-
tion, abatement, and corrective action regarding releases not covered by the 
fund and not on the national priority list as defined in Section 19-6-302. 
(6) The Legislature may appropriate $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998-99 from 
the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund to the Petroleum Storage Tank 
Cleanup Fund created in Section 19-6-405.7. 
(7) For fiscal year 1998-99, up to $5,000,000 in the Petroleum Storage Tank 
Fund carried forward to the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund may be 
appropriated by the Legislature to the Centennial Highway Trust Fund. 
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nutted" m Subsection (6)(c) 
The 1997 amendment by ch 172, effective 
May 5, 1997, inserted "Trust" m Subsection 
(XXa), substituted "assurance fee paid" for "sur-
charge assessed" in Subsection (l)(b)(iu), up-
dated references in Subsections (l)(b)(m) and 
(2Xa), m Subsection (2Kb) substituted "assur-
ance program and fee under Section 19-6-410 5" 
for "surcharge", m Subsection (3) substituted 
"assurance fee" for "surcharge", deleted former 
Subsections (5) and (6) concerning the appro-
priation of the money in the Petroleum Storage 
Tank Fund by the Legislature, and added Sub-
section (5) 
The 1997 amendment by ch 272, effective 
May 5, 1997, deleted Subsection (D(bXin) 
which read "the environmental surcharge as-
sessed under Section 19-6-410, and," redesig-
nating former Subsection (lXb)(iv) as (lXbXm), 
and deleted "and the environmental surcharge" 
after "fund" in Subsections (2Kb) and (3) 
The 1998 amendment by ch 417, effective 
May 4, 1998, added Subsection (6) (Subsection 
(7) in the reconciled version) 
The 1998 amendment by ch 95, effective July 
1,1998, inserted "and any penalties" in Subsec-
tion (lXbXui), and added Subsection (lXbXv) 
(Subsection (IXbXiv) m the reconciled version), 
making a related change 
The 1998 amendment by ch 255, effective 
July 1, 1998, deleted former Subsection 
(IXbXiv) which read "costs recovered under this 
part," making a related change, and added 
Subsection (6) 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel 
Coordination clause. — Laws 1997, chs 
172 and 272 each amended this section, ch 272, 
§ 9 provides that the amendments to this sec-
tion in ch 172 supersede the amendments to 
the same section in ch 272 
Appropriations. — Laws 1998, ch 255, § 6 
appropriates from the Petroleum Storage Tank 
Fund, for fiscal year 1998-99, $2,000,000 to the 
Petroleum Storage Tank Cleanup Fund 
Cross-References. — Civil penalty for vio-
lation, § 19-6-425 
19-6-410. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1997, ch 172, § 26, and ch 
272, § 7, both effective May 5, 1997, repeal § 
19-6-410, as last amended by L 1993 (2nd S S ), 
ch 1, § 1, concerning an environmental sur-
charge on petroleum For provisions relating to 
the voluntary environmental assurance fund, 
see § 19-6-410 5 
This section had been held to violate Utah 
Const, Art XIII, Sec 13, to the extent that the 
surcharge was levied on motor fuels as defined 
in that section of the constitution, in V-l Oil Co 
v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 302 Utah Adv Rep 
30 (Utah 1996) rev'd, 323 Utah Adv Rep 5 
(Utah 1997) 
Coordination clause. — Laws 1997, ch 
330 attempted to amend this section, however, 
ch 172, § 27 provides that the repeal in ch 172 
supersedes the amendment in ch 330 
19-6-410.5. Environmental assurance program — Partici-
pant fee. 
(1) As used in this section, "commission" means the State Tax Commission, 
as defined under Section 59-1-101. 
(2) There is created an Environmental Assurance Program. The program 
shall provide to participating owners and operators, upon payment of the fee 
imposed under Subsection (4), assistance with the costs of investigation, 
abatement, and corrective action regarding releases at facilities participating 
m the program, to the extent provided under Section 19-6-419. 
(3) Participation in the program is voluntary. 
(4) There is assessed an environmental assurance fee of VA cent per gallon on 
the first sale or use of petroleum products in the state. 
(5) Revenue collected under this section shall be used solely for the purposes 
under Section 19-6-409. 
(6) (a) The commission is responsible for the collection of the fee and any 
penalties and interest imposed under this section. 
(b) The commission shall by rule establish* 
(i) the method of payment of the environmental assurance fee; 
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(ii) the procedure for reimbursement or exemption of owners or 
operators who do not participate in the program, including owners 
and operators of above ground storage tanks; and 
(iii) the procedure for confirming with the department those own-
ers and operators who qualify for reimbursement or exemption under 
Subsection (6)(b)(ii). 
(c) The commission may retain an amount not to exceed 2.5% of fees 
collected under this section for the cost to it of rendering its services. 
(7) The person or entity responsible for payment of the fee under this section 
shall pay the fee to the commission on or before the last day of the month 
following the month in which the sale occurs. 
(8) The payment under this section shall be accompanied by the form 
prescribed by the commission. 
(9) (a) The penalties and interest for failure to file the form required under 
this section or to pay the environmental assurance fee are the same as the 
penalties and interest under Sections 59-1-401 and 59-1-402. 
(b) The commission shall deposit penalties and interest collected under 
this section in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund. 
(10) The commission shall report to the department any person or entity 
who is delinquent in payment of the fee under this section. 
History: C. 1953,19-6-410.5, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 172 
1997, ch. 172, § 8; 1998, ch. 95, § 3. became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective July 1, 1998, rewrote the sec-
tion. 
19-6-411. Petroleum storage tank fee for program partici-
pants. 
(1) In addition to the underground storage tank registration fee paid in 
Section 19-6-408, the owner or operator of a petroleum storage tank who elects 
to participate in the environmental assurance program under Section 19-6-
410.5 shall also pay an annual petroleum storage tank fee to the department 
for each facility as follows: 
(a) on and after July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1993, an annual fee of: 
(i) $250 for each tank: 
(A) located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, 
refining, or marketing; or 
(B) with an annual monthly throughput of more than 10,000 
gallons; and 
(ii) $125 for each tank: 
(A) not located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, 
refining, or marketing; and 
(B) with an annual monthly throughput of 10,000 gallons or 
less; 
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(b) on and after July 1, 1993, through June 30, 1994, an annual fee of: 
(i) $150 for each tank: 
(A) located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, 
refining, or marketing; or 
(B) with an average monthly throughput of more than 10,000 
gallons; and 
(ii) $75 for each tank: 
(A) not located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, 
refining, or marketing; and 
(B) with an average monthly throughput of 10,000 gallons or 
less; and 
(c) on and after July 1, 1994, an annual fee of: 
(i) $50 for each tank in a facility with an annual facility throughput 
rate of 400,000 gallons or less; 
(ii) $150 for each tank in a facility with an annual facility through-
put rate of more than 400,000 gallons; and 
(iii) $150 for each tank in a facility regarding which: 
(A) the facility's throughput rate is not reported to the depart-
ment within 30 days after the date this throughput information is 
requested by the department; or 
(B) the owner or operator elects to pay the fee under this 
subsection, rather than report under Subsection (l)(c)(i) or (ii); 
and 
(d) on and after July 1, 1998, for any new tank: 
(i) which is installed to replace an existing tank at an existing 
facility, any annual petroleum storage tank fee paid for the current 
fiscal year for the existing tank is applicable to the new tank; and 
(ii) installed at a new facility or at an existing facility, which is not 
a replacement for another existing tank, the fees are as provided in 
Subsection (l)(c) of this section. 
(2) (a) As a condition of receiving a permit and being eligible for benefits 
under Section 19-6-419 from the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund, 
each underground storage tank installation company shall pay to the 
department the following fees to be deposited in the fund: 
(i) an annual fee of: 
(A) $2,000 per underground storage tank installation company 
if the installation company has installed 15 or fewer underground 
storage tanks within the 12 months preceding the fee due date; or 
(B) $4,000 per underground storage tank installation company 
if the installation company has installed 16 or more underground 
storage tanks within the 12 months preceding the fee due date; 
and 
(ii) $200 for each underground storage tank installed in the state, 
to be paid prior to completion of installation, 
(b) The board shall make rules specifying which portions of an under-
ground storage tank installation shall be subject to the permitting fees 
when less than a full underground storage tank system is installed. 
(3) (a) Fees under Subsection (1) are due on or before July 1 annually. 
(b) If the department does not receive the fee on or before July 1, the 
department shall impose a late penalty of $60 per facility. 
(c) (i) The fee and the late penalty accrue interest at 12% per annum. 
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(ii) If the fee, the late penalty, and all accrued interest are not 
received by the department within 60 days after July 1, the eligibility 
of the owner or operator to receive payments for claims against the 
fund lapses on the 61st day after July 1. 
(iii) In order for the owner or operator to reinstate eligibility to 
receive payments for claims against the fund, the owner or operator 
shall meet the requirements of Subsection 19-6-428(3). 
(4) (a) (i) Fees under Subsection (2)(a)(i) are due on or before July 1 
annually. If the department does not receive the fees on or before July 
1, the department shall impose a late penalty of $60 per installation 
company. The fee and the late penalty accrue interest at 12% per 
annum. 
(ii) If the fee, late penalty, and all accrued interest due are not 
received by the department within 60 days after July 1, the under-
ground storage tank installation company's permit and eligibility to 
receive payments for claims against the fund lapse on the 61st day 
after July 1. 
(b) (i) Fees under Subsection (2)(a)(ii) are due prior to completion of 
installation. If the department does not receive the fees prior to 
completion of installation, the department shall impose a late penalty 
of $60 per facility. The fee and the late penalty accrue interest at 12% 
per annum. 
(ii) If the fee, late penalty, and all accrued interest are not received 
by the department within 60 days after the underground storage tank 
installation is completed, eligibility to receive payments for claims 
against the fund for that tank lapse on the 61st day after the tank 
installation is completed. 
(c) The executive secretary may not reissue the underground storage 
tank installation company permit until the fee, late penalty, and all 
accrued interest are received by the department. 
(5) If the state risk manager determines the fees established in Subsections 
(1) and (2) and the environmental assurance fee established in Section 
19-6-410.5 are insufficient to maintain the fund on an actuarially sound basis, 
he shall petition the Legislature to increase the petroleum storage tank and 
underground storage tank installation company permit fees, and the environ-
mental assurance fee to a level that will sustain the fund on an actuarially 
sound basis. 
(6) The executive secretary may waive all or part of the fees required to be 
paid on or before May 5, 1997, for a petroleum storage tank under this section 
if no fuel has been dispensed from the tank on or after July 1, 1991. 
(7) (a) Each petroleum storage tank or underground storage tank, for which 
payment of fees has been made and other requirements have been met to 
qualify for a certificate of compliance under this part, shall be issued a 
form of identification, as determined by the board under Subsection (7)(b). 
(b) The board shall make rules providing for the identification, through 
a tag or other readily identifiable method, of petroleum storage tanks or 
underground storage tanks under Subsection (7)(a) that qualify for a 
certificate of compliance under this part. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-402, enacted by 1992, ch. 214, § 9; 1994, ch. 297, § 7; 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 12; 1990, ch. 301, § 4; 1995,ep;bal;j ch. 28, § 10; 1995, ch. 242, § 1; 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 180; 1996, ch. 162, § 1; 1997, ch. 172, § 9; 1997, 
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ch. 272, § 2; 1998, ch. 95, § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "through 
June 30, 1994" in the introductory language of 
Subsection (1Kb), added Subsections (l)(c), (2), 
(4)(b), and (10), making related changes, re-
wrote Subsection (3), inserted "or underground 
storage tank installation company permit" in 
Subsections (4)(a), (4Xc), (8)(a), and (8Kb), in-
serted "and underground storage tank installa-
tion company permit" in Subsection (5), substi-
tuted "fees under this section" for "the 
petroleum storage tank fee" in Subsection 
(6Xa), and inserted "or underground tank com-
pany" m Subsection (6)(b) 
The 1995 amendment by ch 28, effective May 
1, 1995, substituted "63-38-3 2" for "63-38-3" in 
Subsection (6)(b) 
The 1995 amendment by ch 242, effective 
July 1, 1995, substituted "$150" for "$175" in 
Subsection (lXcXm), added the (A) designation 
and added Subsection (lXcXinXB), replaced 
"63-38-3" with "63-38-3 2" m Subsection (6Xb), 
rewrote the introductory language of Subsec-
tion (9), which read "Notwithstanding the pro-
visions of this section," and made related 
changes 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, deleted former Subsections (6) to (8), 
relatmg to petroleum storage tank fees, redes-
ignated subsequent subsections accordingly, 
and added Subsection (8) 
The 1997 amendment by ch 172, effective 
May 5, 1997, inserted "who elects to participate 
in the environmental assurance program under 
Section 19-6-410 5" in the introductory para-
graph in Subsection (1), substituted "receiving 
a permit and being eligible for benefits under 
Section 19-6-419 from the Petroleum Storage 
Tank Trust Fund" for "permitting" in the intro-
ductory paragraph m Subsection (2), rewrote 
Subsections (3) and (4), m Subsection (5), sub-
stituted "assurance fee" for "surcharge" near 
the beginning, corrected the reference, and in-
serted "and the environmental assurance fee" 
near the end, and inserted "to be paid on or 
before May 5, 1997" in Subsection (7) 
The 1997 amendment by ch 272, effective 
May 5, 1997, m Subsection (5) deleted "and the 
environmental surcharge established in Sec-
tion 19-6-410" after "Subsections (1) and (2) " 
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, 
added Subsection (l)(d), and deleted former 
Subsection (6) relating to the point of collection 
of assurance fee, redesignating subsections and 
internal references accordingly 
Coordination clause. — Laws 1997, chs 
172 and 272 each amended this section, ch 272, 
§ 9 provides that the amendments to this sec-
tion m ch 172 supersede the amendments to 
the same section in ch 272 
19-6-412. Petroleum storage tank — Certificate of compli-
ance. 
(1) (a) Beginning July 1, 1990, an owner or operator of a petroleum storage 
tank may obtain a certificate of compliance for the facility. 
(b) Effective July 1,1991, each owner or operator of a petroleum storage 
tank shall have a certificate of compliance for the facility. 
(2) The executive secretary shall issue a certificate of compliance if: 
(a) the owner or operator has a certificate of registration; 
(b) the owner or operator demonstrates it is participating in the 
Environmental Assurance Program under Section 19-6-410.5, or other-
wise demonstrates compliance with financial assurance requirements as 
defined by rule; 
(c) all state and federal statutes, rules, and regulations have been 
substantially complied with; and 
(d) all tank test requirements of Section 19-6-413 have been met. 
(3) If the ownership of or responsibility for the petroleum storage tank 
changes, the certificate of compliance is still valid unless it has been revoked 
or has lapsed 
(4) The executive secretary may issue a certificate of compliance for a period 
of less than one year to maintain an administrative schedule of certification. 
(5) The executive secretary shall reissue a certificate of compliance if the 
owner or operator of an underground storage tank has complied with the 
requirements of Subsection (2). 
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(6) If the owner or operator electing to participate in the program has a 
number of tanks in an area where the executive secretary finds it would be 
difiScult to accurately determine which of the tanks may be the source of a 
release, the owner may only elect to place all of the tanks in the area in the 
program, but not just some of the tanks in the area. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-403, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amand-
in 1989, ch. 268, § 13; 1990, ch. 301, § 5; merit, effective May 5, 1997, rewrote Subsec-
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 181; tion (2)(b) and added Subsection (6). 
1992, ch. 214, § 10; 1997, ch. 172, § 10. 
19-6-413. Tank tightness test — Actions required after 
testing* 
(1) The owner or operator of any petroleum storage tank registered prior to 
July 1, 1991, must submit to the executive secretary the results of a tank 
tightness test conducted: 
(a) on or after September 1, 1989, and prior to January 1, 1990, if the 
test meets requirements set by rule regarding tank tightness tests that 
were applicable during that period; or 
(b) on or after January 1, 1990, and prior to July 1, 1991. 
(2) The owner or operator of any petroleum storage tank registered on or 
after July 1,1991, must submit to the executive secretary the results of a tank 
tightness test conducted within the six months before the tank was registered 
or within 60 days after the date the tank was registered. 
(3) If the tank test performed under Subsection (1) or (2) shows no release 
of petroleum, the owner or operator of the petroleum storage tank shall submit 
a letter to the executive secretary at the same time the owner or operator 
submits the test results, stating that under customary business inventory 
practices standards, the owner or operator is not aware of any release of 
petroleum from the tank. 
(4) (a) If the tank test shows a release of petroleum from the petroleum 
storage tank, the owner or operator of the tank shall: 
(i) correct the problem; and 
(ii) submit evidence of the correction to the executive secretary, 
(b) When the executive secretary receives evidence from an owner or 
operator of a petroleum storage tank that the problem with the tank has 
been corrected, the executive secretary shall: 
(i) approve or disapprove the correction; and 
(ii) notify the owner or operator that the correction has been 
approved or disapproved. 
(5) The executive secretary shall review the results of the tank tightness 
test to determine compliance with this part and any rules adopted under the 
authority of Section 19-6-403. 
(6) If the owner or operator of the tank is required by 40 C.F.R., Part 280, 
Subpart D, to perform release detection on the tank, the owner or operator 
shall submit the results of the tank tests in compliance with 40 C.F.R., Par t 
280, Subpart D. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-404, enacted by renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 182; 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 14; 1990, ch. 301, § 6; 1992, ch. 214, § 11. 
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19-6-414. Grounds for revocation of certificate of compli-
ance and ineligibility for payment of costs from 
fund. 
(1) If the executive secretary determines that any of the requirements of 
Subsection 19-6-412(2) and Section 19-6-413 have not been met, the executive 
secretary shall notify the owner or operator by certified mail that: 
(a) his certificate of compliance may be revoked; 
(b) if he is participating in the program, he is violating the eligibility 
requirements for the fund; and 
(c) he shall demonstrate his compliance with this part within 60 days 
after receipt of the notification or his certificate of compliance will be 
revoked and if participating in the program he will be ineligible to receive 
payment for claims against the fund. 
(2) If the executive secretary determines the owner's or operator's compli-
ance problems have not been resolved within 60 days after receipt of the 
notification in Subsection (1), the executive secretary shall send written notice 
to the owner or operator that the owner's or operator's certificate of compliance 
is revoked and he is no longer eligible for payment of costs from the fund. 
(3) Revocation of certificates of compliance may be appealed to the executive 
director. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-405, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amand-
in 1989, ch. 268, § 15; renumbered by L. ment, effective May 5, 1997, added aif partici-
1991, ch. 112, § 183; 1992, ch. 214, § 12; pating in the program" in Subsections (1Kb) 
1997, ch. 172, § 11. and (l)(c). 
19-6-415. Participation of exempt and above ground 
tanks. 
(1) An underground storage tank exempt from regulation under 40 C.F.R., 
Part 280, Subpart A, may become eligible for payments from the Petroleum 
Storage Tank Trust Fund if it: 
(a) (i) is a farm or residential tank with a capacity of 1,100 gallons or 
less and is used for storing motor fuel for noncommercial purposes; 
(ii) is used for storing heating oil for consumptive use on the 
premises where stored; or 
(iii) is used for any oxygenate blending component for motor fuels; 
(b) complies with the requirements of Section 19-6-412; 
(c) meets other requirements established by rules made under Section 
19-6-403; and 
(d) pays registration and tank fees and environmental assurance fees, 
equivalent to those fees outlined in Sections 19-6-408, 19-6-410.5, and 
19-6-411. 
(2) An above ground petroleum storage tank may become eligible for 
payments from the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund if the owner or 
operator: 
(a) pays those fees that are equivalent to the registration and tank fees 
and environmental assurance fees under Sections 19-6-408, 19-6-410.5, 
and 19-6-411; 
(b) complies with the requirements of Section 19-6-412; and 
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(c) meets other requirements established by rules made under Section 
19-6-403. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-406, enacted by former introductory paragraph as Subsection 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 16; renumbered by L. (1), redesignating subsections accordingly; in 
1991, ch. 112, § 184; 1992, ch. 214, § 13; the introductory paragraph of Subsection (1) 
1997, ch. 172, § 12. added "Trust"; and added Subsections (lXd) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- and (2). 
ment, effective May 5, 1997, designated the 
19-6-415.5. State-owned underground tanks to partici-
pate in program. 
Any underground storage tank owned or leased by the state of Utah and 
subject to the financial assurance requirements established by division rule 
shall participate in the program. 
History: C. 1953,19-6-415.5, enacted by L. became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
1997, ch. 172, § 13. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 172 
19-6-416. Restrictions on delivery of petroleum — Civil 
penalty. 
(1) After July 1, 1991, a person may not deliver petroleum to, place 
petroleum in, or accept petroleum for placement in a petroleum storage tank 
that is not identified in compliance with Subsection 19-6-411(8). 
(2) Any person who delivers or accepts delivery of petroleum to a petroleum 
storage tank or places petroleum, including waste petroleum substances, in an 
underground storage tank in violation of Subsection (1) is subject to a civil 
penalty of not more than $500 for each occurrence. 
(3) The executive secretary shall issue a notice of agency action assessing a 
civil penalty of not more than $500 against any person who delivers or accepts 
delivery of petroleum to a petroleum storage tank or places petroleum, 
including waste petroleum substances, in violation of Subsection (1) in a 
petroleum storage tank or underground storage tank. 
(4) A civil penalty may not be assessed under this section against any person 
who in good faith delivers or places petroleum in a petroleum storage tank or 
underground storage tank that is identified in compliance with Subsection 
19-6-411(8) and rules made under that subsection, whether or not the tank is 
in actual compliance with the other requirements of Section 19-6-411. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-407, enacted by Compiler's Notes. — References to "Subsec-
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 17; 1990, ch. 301, § 7; tion 19-6-411(8r in Subsections (1) and (4) 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 185; should probably be to Subsection 19-6-411(7). 
1992, ch. 214, § 14; 1996, ch. 162, § 2. Laws 1998, ch. 95, § 4 deleted a subsection and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- renumbered former Subsection 19-6-411(8) as 
ment, effective April 29, 1996, rewrote this 19-6-411(7). 
section, adding Subsection (4). 
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19-6-416.5, Restrictions on underground storage tank in-
stallation companies — Civil penalty. 
(1) After July 1, 1994, no individual or underground installation company 
may install an underground storage tank without having a valid underground 
storage tank installation company permit. 
(2) Any individual or underground storage tank installation company who 
installs an underground storage tank in violation of Subsection (1) is subject to 
a civil penalty of $500 per underground storage tank. 
(3) The executive secretary shall issue a notice of agency action assessing a 
civil penalty of $500 against any underground storage tank installation 
company or person who installs an underground storage tank in violation of 
Subsection (1). 
History: C. 1953,19-6-416.5, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 297, 
1994, ch. 297, § 8. § 16 makes the act effective on July 1, 1994. 
19-6-417. Use of fund revenues to investigate certain re-
leases from petroleum storage tank. 
If the executive secretary is notified of or otherwise becomes aware of a 
release or suspected release of petroleum, he may expend revenues from the 
fund to investigate the release or suspected release if he has reasonable cause 
to believe the release is from a tank that is covered by the fund. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-501, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 18; renumbered by L. ment, effective May 5, 1997, added "if he has 
1991, ch. 112, § 186; 1992, ch. 214, § 15; reasonable cause to believe..."to the end of the 
1997, ch. 172, § 14. provision. 
19-6-418. Recovery of costs by executive secretary. 
(1) The executive secretary may recover: 
(a) from a responsible party the proportionate share of costs the party 
is responsible for as determined under Section 19-6-424.5; 
(b) any amount required to be paid by the owner under this part which 
the owner has not paid; and 
(c) costs of collecting the amounts in Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b). 
(2) The executive secretary may pursue an action or recover costs from any 
other person if that person caused or substantially contributed to the release. 
(3) All costs recovered under this section shall be deposited in the Petroleum 
Storage Tank Cleanup Fund created in Section 19-6-405.7. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-502, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 19; renumbered by L. merit, effective July 1, 1998, made two minor 
1991, ch. 112, § 187; 1992, ch. 214, § 16; stylistic changes in Subsection (l)(c), and added 
1998, ch. 255, § 3. Subsection (3). 
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19-6-419- Costs covered by the fund — Costs paid by 
owner or operator — Payments to third parties 
— Apportionment of costs-
(1) If all requirements of this part have been met and a release occurs from 
a tank that is covered by the fund, the costs per release shall be covered as 
provided under this section. 
(2) The responsible party shall pay: 
(a) the first $10,000 of costs; and 
(b) (i) all costs over $1,000,000, if the release was from a tank: 
(A) located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, 
refining, or marketing; or 
(B) with an average monthly facility throughput of more than 
10,000 gallons; and 
(ii) all costs over $500,000, if the release was from a tank: 
(A) not located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, 
refining, or marketing; and 
(B) with an average monthly facility throughput of 10,000 
gallons or less. 
(3) If money is available in the fund and the responsible party has paid costs 
of $10,000, the executive secretary shall pay costs from the fund in an amount 
not to exceed: 
(a) $990,000 if the release was from a tank: 
(i) located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, refining, 
or marketing; or 
(ii) with an average monthly facility throughput of more than 
10,000 gallons; and 
(b) $490,000 if the release was from a tank: 
(i) not located at a facility engaged in petroleum production, 
refining, or marketing; and 
(ii) with an average monthly facility throughput of 10,000 gallons 
or less. 
(4) The total costs of tank releases regarding any responsible party that may 
be paid in any fiscal year by fund monies are: 
(a) $990,000 for a responsible party of one to 99 petroleum storage 
tanks; or 
(b) $1,990,000 for a responsible party of 100 or more petroleum storage 
tanks. 
(5) (a) In authorizing payments for costs from the fund, the executive 
secretary shall apportion monies first to legal, adjusting, and actuarial 
expenses incurred by the state; expenses incurred in investigation, abate-
ment action, and corrective action; and then to payment of judgments, 
awards, or settlements to third parties for bodily injury or property 
damage. 
(b) The board shall make rules governing the apportionment of costs 
among third party claimants. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-503, enacted by ch. 297, § 9; 1996, ch. 162, § 3; 1997, ch. L72, 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 20; 1990, ch. 301, § 8; § 15. 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 188; Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1991, ch. 252, § 1; 1992, ch. 214, § 17; 1994, ment, effective July 1, 1994, redesignated 
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former Subsections (lXa) and (b) as Subsec- rewrote the introductory language of Subsec-
tions (2) and (3), redesignating former Subsec- tions (3), (3)(a), and (3Xb); and rewrote Subsec-
tions (2) and (3) as Subsections (4) and (5), tion (4). 
making related internal designation changes in The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
present Subsections (2) and (3), and making a 1996, deleted all references to the dates and 
related stylistic change at the end of Subsection deductible costs of release throughout this sec-
CD; substituted "$10,000 of costs if the release ^on 
occurred on or before July 1 1996" for "$25 000
 The 1 9 9 ? a m e n d m e n t > e f f e c t i v e M 5> 1 9 9 7 j 
°
f C
°f^ m . .f u b s e c ^ 1 0 n J ? ^ 0 ; a d i e d u S u b s e c ' added "from a tank that is covered by the fund" 
tion (2Xa)(n); inserted facility in Subsections . q n u Q p r H m i m (2)(bXiXB), (2)(b)(iiXB), (3)(aXii), and (3Xb)(ii); m ^ U D S e c u o n u ' -
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Recovery of costs. the first $10,000, the Fund has paid more than 
The provision allowing the secretary to re- the $990,000 authorized under this section, or 
cover costs from owner, § 19-6-424.5, is con- the owner is not covered because it lacks a 
strued to provide for recovery of costs in the compliance certificate. V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State 
limited situations where the Fund has paid to Tax Comm'n, 942 R2d 906 (Utah 1997). 
clean up a spill and the owner has not covered 
19-6-420. Releases — Abatement actions — Corrective 
actions* 
(1) If the executive secretary determines that a release from a petroleum 
storage tank has occurred, he shall: 
(a) identify and name as many of the responsible parties as reasonably 
possible; and 
(b) determine which responsible parties, if any, are covered by the fund 
regarding the release in question. 
(2) Regardless of whether the tank generating the release is covered by the 
fund, the executive secretary may: 
(a) order the owner or operator to take abatement, investigative, or 
corrective action, including the submission of a corrective action plan; and 
(b) if the owner or operator fails to take any of the abatement, 
investigative, or corrective action ordered by the executive secretary, the 
executive secretary may take any one or more of the following actions: 
(i) subject to the conditions in this part, use monies from the fund, 
if the tank involved is covered by the fund, state cleanup appropria-
tion, or the Petroleum Storage Tank Cleanup Fund created under 
Section 19-6-405.7 to perform investigative, abatement, or corrective 
action; 
(ii) commence an enforcement proceeding; 
(iii) enter into agreements or issue orders as allowed by Section 
19-6-424.5; or 
(iv) recover costs from responsible parties equal to their proportion-
ate share of liability as determined by Section 19-6-424.5. 
(3) (a) Subject to the limitations established in Section 19-6-419, the 
executive secretary shall provide monies from the fund for abatement 
action for a release generated by a tank covered by the fund if: 
(i) the owner or operator takes the abatement action ordered by the 
executive secretary; and 
(ii) the executive secretary approves the abatement action. 
(b) If a release presents the possibility of imminent and substantial 
danger to the public health or the environment, the owner or operator may 
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take immediate abatement action and petition the executive secretary for 
reimbursement from the fund for the costs of the abatement action. If the 
owner or operator can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the executive 
secretary that the abatement action was reasonable and timely in light of 
circumstances, the executive secretary shall reimburse the petitioner for 
costs associated with immediate abatement action, subject to the limita-
tions established in Section 19-6-419. 
(c) The owner or operator shall notify the executive secretary within 24 
hours of the abatement action taken. 
(4) (a) If the executive secretary determines corrective action is necessary, 
the executive secretary shall order the owner or operator to submit a 
corrective action plan to address the release. 
(b) If the owner or operator submits a corrective action plan, the 
executive secretary shall review the corrective action plan and approve or 
disapprove the plan. 
(c) In reviewing the corrective action plan, the executive secretary shall 
consider the following: 
(i) the threat to public health; 
(ii) the threat to the environment; and 
(iii) the cost-effectiveness of alternative corrective actions. 
(5) If the executive secretary approves the corrective action plan or develops 
his own corrective action plan, he shall: 
(a) approve the estimated cost of implementing the corrective action 
plan; 
(b) order the owner or operator to implement the corrective action plan; 
(c) (i) if the release is covered by the fund, determine the amount of 
fund monies to be allocated to an owner or operator to implement a 
corrective action plan; and 
(ii) subject to the limitations established in Section 19-6-419, 
provide monies from the fund to the owner or operator to implement 
the corrective action plan. 
(6) (a) The executive secretary may not distribute any monies from the fund 
for corrective action until the owner or operator obtains the executive 
secretary's approval of the corrective action plan. 
(b) An owner or operator who begins corrective action without first 
obtaining approval from the executive secretary and who is covered by the 
fund may be reimbursed for the costs of the corrective action, subject to the 
limitations established in Section 19-6-419, if: 
(i) the owner or operator submits the corrective action plan to the 
executive secretary within seven days after beginning corrective 
action; and 
(ii) the executive secretary approves the corrective action plan. 
(7) If the executive secretary disapproves the plan, he shall solicit a new 
corrective action plan from the owner or operator. 
(8) If the executive secretary disapproves the second corrective action plan, 
or if the owner or operator fails to submit a second plan within a reasonable 
time, the executive secretary may: 
(a) develop his own corrective action plan; and 
(b) act as authorized under Subsections (2) and (5). 
(9) (a) When notified that the corrective action plan has been implemented, 
the executive secretary shall inspect the location of the release to deter-
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mine whether or not the corrective action has been properly performed 
and completed. 
(b) If the executive secretary determines the corrective action has not 
been properly performed or completed, he may issue an order requiring 
the owner or operator to complete the corrective action within the time 
specified in the order. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-601, enacted by the release is" for "responsible parties are"; in 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 21; 1990, ch. 301, § 9; Subsection (2XbXi) added "if the tank involved 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 189; is covered by the fund"; and in Subsection (3Xa) 
1992, ch. 214, § 18; 1994, ch. 297, § 10; 1997, added "for a release generated by a tank cov-
ch. 172, § 16; 1998, ch. 255, § 4. ered by the fund." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "state
 i n Subsection (2)(bXi) inserted "or the Petro-
cleanup appropriation" for "fund surplus" in i e u m Storage Tank Cleanup Fund created un-
Subsection (2)(b)(i).
 d e r S e c t i o n 19-6-405.7," making a related 
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
 c n a n g e 
in Subsection (2) substituted "tank generating 
19-6-421. Third party payment restrictions and require-
ments, 
(1) If there are sufficient revenues in the fund, and subject to the provisions 
of Sections 19-6-419, 19-6-422, and 19-6-423, the executive secretary shall 
authorize payment from the fund to third parties regarding a release covered 
by the fund as provided in Subsection (2) if: 
(a) (i) he is notified that a final judgment or award has been entered 
against the responsible party covered by the fund that determines 
liability for bodily injury or property damage to third parties caused 
by a release from the tank; or 
(ii) approved by the state risk manager, the responsible party has 
agreed to pay an amount in settlement of a claim arising from the 
release; and 
(b) the responsible party has failed to satisfy the judgment or award, or 
pay the amount agreed to. 
(2) The executive secretary shall authorize payment to the third parties of 
the amount of the judgment, award, or amount agreed to subject to the 
limitations established in Section 19-6-419. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-602, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 22; renumbered by L. ment, effective May 5,1997, added "regarding a 
1991, ch. 112, § 190; 1992, ch. 214, § 19; release covered by the fund" in Subsection (1). 
1993, ch. 188, § 1; 1997, ch. 172, § 17. 
19-6-422. Participation by state risk manager in suit, 
claim, or settlement, 
(1) If a suit is filed or a claim is made against a responsible party who is 
eligible for payments from the fund for bodily injury or property damage 
connected with a release of petroleum from a petroleum storage tank, the state 
risk manager and his legal counsel may participate with the responsible party 
and his legal counsel in: 
(a) the defense of any suit; 
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(b) determination of legal strategy and any other decisions affecting the 
defense of any suit; and 
(c) any settlement negotiations. 
(2) The state risk manager shall approve any settlement between the 
responsible party and a third party before payment of fund monies is made. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-603, enacted by Cross-References. — Risk manager, 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 23; renumbered by L. § 63A-4-101 et seq. 
1991, ch. 112, § 191; 1992, ch. 214, § 20. 
19-6-423. Claim or suit against responsible parties — 
Prerequisites for payment from fund to respon-
sible parties or third parties — Limitations of 
liability for third party claims. 
(1) In order to be eligible for payments from the fund, if a responsible party 
receives actual or constructive notice of an occurrence likely to give rise to a 
claim, that a suit has been filed, or a claim has been made against him for 
bodily injury or property damage connected with a release of petroleum from 
a petroleum storage tank, the responsible party shall: 
(a) inform the state risk manager immediately of the occurrence, suit, 
or claim; 
(b) allow the state risk manager and his legal counsel to participate 
with the responsible party and his legal counsel in: 
(i) the defense of any suit; 
(ii) determination of legal strategy and any other decisions affect-
ing the defense of any suit; and 
(hi) any settlement negotiations; and 
(c) conduct the defense of any suit or claim in good faith. 
(2) The executive secretary may not authorize payment of fund monies for 
any judgment or award to third parties unless the state risk manager: 
(a) indicates that he was not prevented from participating in the 
defense of the suit; and 
(b) approves the settlement. 
(3) In making payments to third parties from the fund pursuant to Section 
19-6-421, or in funding a corrective action plan pursuant to Section 19-6-420, 
the executive secretary may not pay an award or judgment or fund a corrective 
action plan to the extent that it imposes any liability or makes any payment 
for: 
(a) obligations of a responsible party under a workers' compensation, 
disability benefits, or unemployment compensation law or other similar 
law; 
(b) bodily injury to an employee of the responsible party arising from 
and in the course of his employment or to the spouse, child, parent, 
brother, sister, heirs, or personal representatives of that employee as a 
result of that bodily injury; 
(c) bodily injury or property damage arising from the ownership, 
maintenance, use, or entrustment to others of any aircraft, motor vehicle, 
or watercraft; 
(d) property damage to any property owned by, occupied by, rented to, 
loaned to, bailed to, or otherwise in the care, custody, or control of the 
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owner or operator except to the extent necessary to complete a corrective 
action plan; 
(e) bodily injury or property damage for which the responsible party is 
obligated to pay damages only by reason of the assumption of liability in 
a contract or agreement, other than a contract or agreement entered into 
to meet the financial responsibility requirements of Subtitle I of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C., Section 6991c, et seq., 
or this part, or regulations or rules made under either of them; 
(f) bodily injury or property damage for which the responsible party is 
liable to a third party solely on account of personal injury to the spouse of 
that third party; 
(g) bodily injury or property damage caused by a release from a 
petroleum storage tank covered by the fund or the cost of a corrective 
action plan, where the total amount previously paid by the executive 
secretary to compensate third parties or for funding a corrective action 
plan in respect to that same accidental release from the covered tank 
equals $990,000; or 
(h) bodily injury or property damage caused by a release from a 
petroleum storage tank covered by the fund or the cost of a corrective 
action plan when the total amount previously paid by the executive 
secretary to compensate third parties or for funding corrective action 
plans in respect to releases from tanks of any one responsible party during 
any fiscal year equals $990,000 for a responsible party regarding one to 99 
petroleum storage tanks or $1,990,000 for a responsible party regarding 
100 or more petroleum storage tanks. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-604, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 24; 1990, ch. 301, § 10; ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsections 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 192; (3)(g) and (3)(h) substituted "$990,000" for 
1991, ch. 252, § 2; 1992, ch. 214, § 21; 1997, "$975,000" and substituted "$1,990,000" for 
ch. 172, § 18. "$1,975,000" in Subsection (3Xh). 
19-6-424. Claims not covered by fund. 
(1) The executive secretary may not authorize payments from the fund 
unless: 
(a) the claim was based on a release occurring during a period for which 
that tank was covered by the fund; 
(b) the claim was made: 
(i) during a period for which that tank was covered by the fund; or 
(ii) (A) within one year after that fund-covered tank is closed; or 
(B) within six months after the end of the period during which 
the tank was covered by the fund; and 
(c) there are sufficient revenues in the fund. 
(2) The executive secretary may not authorize payments from the fund for 
an underground storage tank installation company unless: 
(a) the claim was based on a release occurring during the period prior to 
the issuance of a certificate of compliance; 
(b) the claim was made within 12 months after the date the tank is 
issued a certificate of compliance for that tank; and 
(c) there are sufficient revenues in the fund. 
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(3) The executive secretary may require the claimant to provide additional 
information as necessary to demonstrate coverage by the fund at the time of 
submittal of the claim. 
(4) If the Legislature repeals or refuses to reauthorize the program for 
petroleum storage tanks established in this part, the executive secretary may 
authorize payments from the fund as provided in this part for claims made 
until the end of the time period established in Subsection (1) or (2) provided 
there are sufficient revenues in the fund. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-605, enacted by nated Subsection (D(bXii) as (lXbXiiXA); in 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 25; 1991, ch. 112, § 193; Subsection (lXbXiiXA) deleted "the end of a 
1992, ch. 214, § 22; 1997, ch. 172, § 19. period during which the responsible party held 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- a valid certificate of compliance for" after "year 
ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection after" and added "fund-covered" and "is closed; 
(lXa) and (lXb)(i) deleted "a responsible party or"; added Subsections (D(bXiiXB), (2), and (3), 
holds or has previously held a valid certificate redesignating former Subsection (2) as (4); and 
of compliance for" before "that tank" and added in Subsection (4) added "or (2)" after the first 
"was covered by the fund" thereafter; redesig- reference. 
19-6-424.5. Apportionment of liability — Liability agree-
ments — Legal remedies — Amounts recovered. 
(1) After providing notice and opportunity for comment to responsible 
parties identified and named under Section 19-6-420, the executive secretary 
may: 
(a) issue written orders determining responsible parties; 
(b) issue written orders apportioning liability among responsible par-
ties; and 
(c) take action, including legal action or issuing written orders, to 
recover costs from responsible parties, including costs of any investigation, 
abatement, and corrective action performed under this part. 
(2) (a) In any apportionment of liability, whether made by the executive 
secretary or made in any administrative proceeding or judicial action, the 
following standards apply: 
(i) liability shall be apportioned among responsible parties in 
proportion to their respective contributions to the release; and 
(ii) the apportionment of liability shall be based on equitable 
factors, including the quantity, mobility, persistence, and toxicity of 
regulated substances contributed by a responsible party, and the 
comparative behavior of a responsible party in contributing to the 
release, relative to other responsible parties. 
(b) (i) The burden of proving proportionate contribution shall be borne 
by each responsible party. 
(ii) If a responsible party does not prove his proportionate contri-
bution, the court, the board, or the executive secretary shall apportion 
liability to the party based on available evidence and the standards of 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(c) The court, the board, or the executive secretary may not impose joint 
and several liability 
(d) Each responsible party is strictly liable for his share of costs. 
(3) The failure of the executive secretary to name all responsible parties is 
not a defense to an action under this section. 
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(4) The executive secretary may enter into an agreement with any respon-
sible party regarding that party's proportionate share of liability or any action 
to be taken by that party. 
(5) The executive secretary and a responsible party may not enter into an 
agreement under this part unless all responsible parties named and identified 
under Subsection 19-6-420(l)(a): 
(a) have been notified in writing by either the executive secretary or the 
responsible party of the proposed agreement; and 
(b) have been given an opportunity to comment on the proposed 
agreement prior to the parties' entering into the agreement. 
(6) (a) Any party who incurs costs under this part in excess of his liability 
may seek contribution from any other party who is or may be liable under 
this part for the excess costs in the district court. 
(b) In resolving claims made under Subsection (6)(a), the court shall 
allocate costs using the standards in Subsection (2). 
(7) (a) A party who has resolved his liability under this part is not liable for 
claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the agreement or 
order. 
(b) (i) An agreement or order determining liability under this part does 
not discharge any of the liability of responsible parties who are not 
parties to the agreement or order, unless the terms of the agreement 
or order expressly provide otherwise. 
(ii) An agreement or order determining liability made under this 
subsection reduces the potential liability of other responsible parties 
by the amount of the agreement or order. 
(8) (a) If the executive secretary obtains less than complete relief from a 
party who has resolved his liability under this section, the executive 
secretary may bring an action against any party who has not resolved his 
liability as determined in an order. 
(b) In apportioning liability, the standards of Subsection (2) apply. 
(c) A party who resolved his liability for some or all of the costs under 
this part may seek contribution from any person who is not a party to the 
agreement or order. 
(9) (a) An agreement or order determining liability under this part may 
provide that the executive secretary will pay for costs of actions that the 
parties have agreed to perform, but which the executive secretary has 
agreed to finance, under the terms of the agreement or order. 
(b) If the executive secretary makes payments from the fund or state 
cleanup appropriation, he may recover the amount paid using the author-
ity of Section 19-6-420 and this section or any other applicable authority. 
(c) Any amounts recovered under this section shall be deposited in the 
Petroleum Storage Tank Cleanup Fund created under Section 19-6-405.7. 
History: C. 1953,19-6-424.5, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 214, § 23; 1994, ch. 297, § 11; 1998, 
ch. 255, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "state 
cleanup appropriation" for "fund surplus" in 
Subsection (9)(b). 
The 1998 amendment, effective July 1, 1998, 
made a minor stylistic change in Subsections 
(2)(b)(ii) and (6)(b), and added Subsection (9)(c). 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Recovery of costs. paid more than the $990,000 authorized under 
This section is construed to provide for recov- § 19-6-419, or the owner is not covered because 
ery of costs in the limited situations where the it lacks a compliance certificate. V-l Oil Co. v. 
Fund has paid to clean up a spill and the owner Utah State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 
has not covered the first $10,000, the Fund has 1997). 
19-6-425. Violation of part — Civil penalty — Suit in 
district court. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 19-6-407, any person who violates any 
requirement of this part or any order issued or rule made under the authority 
of this part is subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 per day for 
each day of violation. 
(2) The executive secretary may enforce any requirement, rule, agreement, 
or order issued under this part by bringing a suit in the district court in the 
county where the underground storage tank or petroleum storage tank is 
located. 
(3) The department shall deposit the penalties collected under this part in 
the Petroleum Storage Tank Restricted Account created under Section 19-6-
405.5. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-606, enacted by ment, effective May 5, 1997, in Subsection (3) 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 26; renumbered by L. substituted "Petroleum Storage Tank Re-
1991, ch. 112, § 194; 1992, ch. 214, § 24; stricted Account" for "Underground Storage 
1997, ch. 172, § 20. Tank Account." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
19-6-426. Limitation of liability of state — Liability of 
responsible parties — Indemnification agree-
ment involving responsible parties. 
(1) This part is not intended to create an insurance program. 
(2) The fund established in this part shall only provide funds to finance costs 
for responsible parties who meet the requirements of this part when releases 
from petroleum storage tanks occur. 
(3) The assets of the fund, if any, are the sole source of monies to pay claims 
against the fund. 
(4) The state is not liable for: 
(a) any amounts payable from the fund for which the fund does not have 
sufficient assets; 
(b) any expenses or debts of the fund; or 
(c) any claim arising from the creation, management, rate-setting, or 
any other activity pertaining to the fund. 
(5) The responsible parties are liable for any costs associated with any 
release from the underground storage tank system. 
(6) This part does not preclude a responsible party from enforcing or 
recovering under any agreement or contract for indemnification associated 
with a release from the tank or from pursuing any other legal remedies that 
may be available against any party. 
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(7) If any payment is made under this part, the fund shall be subrogated to 
all the responsible parties' rights of recovery against any person or organiza-
tion and the responsible parties shall execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure the rights. The responsible 
parties shall do nothing after a release is discovered to prejudice the rights. In 
the event of recovery by the fund, any amount recovered shall first be used to 
reimburse the responsible parties for costs they are required to pay pursuant 
to Section 19-6-419. 
(8) Parties who elect to participate in the fund do so subject to the conditions 
and limitations in this section and in this part. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-701, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 27; 1990, ch. 301, § 11; ment, effective May 5, 1997, added Subsection 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch, 112, § 195; (8). 
1992, ch. 214, § 25; 1997, ch. 172, § 21. 
19-6-427. Liability of any person under other laws — 
Additional state and governmental immunity — 
Exceptions. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), nothing in this part affects or 
modifies in any way: 
(a) the obligations or liability of any person under any other provision of 
this part or state or federal law, including common law, for damages, 
injury, or loss resulting from a release or substantial threat of a release of 
petroleum from an underground storage tank or a petroleum storage tank; 
or 
(b) the liability of any person for costs incurred except as provided in 
this part. 
(2) In addition to the governmental immunity granted in Title 63, Chapter 
30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the state and its political subdivisions 
are not liable for actions performed under this part except as a result of 
intentional misconduct or gross negligence including reckless, willful, or 
wanton misconduct. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-702, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 28; renumbered by L. 
1991, ch. 112, § 196. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Tort liability for pollution from 
underground storage tank, 5 A.L.R.5th 1. 
19-6-428. Eligibility for participation in the fund. 
(1) All owners and operators of existing petroleum storage tanks that are 
covered by the fund on May 5, 1997, may elect to continue to participate in the 
program by meeting the requirements of this part, including paying the tank 
fees and environmental assurance fee as provided in Sections 19-6-410.5 and 
19-6-411. 
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(2) Any new petroleum storage tanks installed after May 5, 1997, or tanks 
ehgible under Section 19-6-415, may elect to participate in the program by 
complying with the requirements of this part. 
(3) All owners and operators of petroleum storage tanks who elect to not 
participate in the program, including by the use of an alternative financial 
assurance mechanism, shall comply with the following requirements in order 
to subsequently participate in the program: 
(a) perform a tank tightness test and site check, including soil and 
groundwater samples to demonstrate no release of petroleum exists or 
adequate remediation of releases as required by board rules; and 
(b) comply with the requirements of this part. 
History: C. 1953, 19-0-428, enacted by L. tanks not participating in the assurance pro-
1997, ch. 172, § 22; 1998, ch. 95, § 5. gram, redesignating former Subsection (3Xc) as 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- (3)(b). 
ment, effective July 1, 1998, substituted "the Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 172 
following requirements" for "this Subsection became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
(3)" in Subsection (3); and deleted former Sub- Utah Const. Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section (3Xb) relating to remitting fees for 
19-6-429. False information and claims* 
(1) Any person who presents or causes to be presented any oral or written 
statement, knowing the statement contains false information, in order to 
obtain a certificate of compliance is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) (a) Any person who presents or causes to be presented any claim for 
payment from the fund, knowing the claim contains materially false 
information or knowing the claim is not eligible for payment from the 
fund, is subject to the criminal penalties under Section 76-10-1801 
regarding fraud. 
(b) The level of criminal penalty shall be determined by the value 
involved, in the same manner as in Section 76-10-1801. 
History: C. 1953, 19-6-429, enacted by L. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
1997, ch. 172, § 23. Cross-References.— Sentencing for misde-
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 172 meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
PART 5 
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT 
19-6-501. Short title. 
This part is known as the "Solid Waste Management Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-32-1, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Interstate Compact 
1981, ch. 126, § 31; renumbered by L. 1991, on Low-Level Radioactive Waste, §§ 19-3-201 
ch. 112, § 197. to 19-3-205. 
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substantive requirements of CERCLA, he shall request that the respon-
sible parties take additional actions to fulfill the agreement to implement 
the remedial action plan. 
(b) If the responsible parties refuse to comply with the request, the 
executive director may take action to enforce the agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14d-704, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amand-
in 1989, ch. 190, § 22; renumbered by Lu ment, effective April 30, 2001, deleted "written" 
1991, ch. 112, § 165; 2001, ch. 275, § 5. before "notice" in Subsection (1). 
PART 4 
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK ACT 
19-6-402, Definitions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in V-l Oil Co. v. Division of Envtl. 
Response & Remediation, 962 R2d 93 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
19-6-409. Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund created — 
Source of revenues. 
(1) (a) There is created an expendable trust fund entitled the Petroleum 
Storage Tank Trust Fund. 
(b) The sole sources of revenues for the fund are: 
(i) petroleum storage tank fees under Section 19-6-411; 
(ii) underground storage tank installation company permit fees 
under Section 19-6-411; 
(iii) the environmental assurance fee and any penalties, paid under 
Section 19-6-410.5; and 
(iv) any interest accrued on these revenues. 
(c) Interest earned on fund monies shall be deposited into the fund. 
(2) Fund monies may be used to pay: 
(a) costs as provided in Section 19-6-419; and 
(b) for the administration of the fund and the environmental assurance 
program and fee under Section 19-6-410.5. 
(3) Costs for the administration of the fund and the environmental assur-
ance fee shall be appropriated by the Legislature. 
(4) The executive secretary may expend monies from the fund for: 
(a) legal and claims adjusting costs incurred by the state in connection 
with claims, judgments, awards, or settlements for bodily injury or 
property damage to third parties; 
(b) costs incurred by the state risk manager in determining the actu-
arial soundness of the fund; and 
(c) other costs as provided in this part. 
(5) For fiscal year 1997-98, money in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust 
Fund, up to a maximum of $2,200,000, may be appropriated by the Legislature 
to the department as nonlapsing funds to be applied to the costs of investiga-
tion, abatement, and corrective action regarding releases not covered by the 
fund and not on the national priority list as defined in Section 19-6-302. 
*±u 
(6) The Legislature may appropriate $2,000,000 for fiscal year 1998-99 from 
the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund to the Petroleum Storage Tank 
Cleanup Fund created in Section 19-6-405.7. 
(7) For fiscal year 1998-99, up to $5,000,000 in the Petroleum Storage Tank 
Fund carried forward to the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund may be 
appropriated by the Legislature to the Centennial Highway Fund created 
under Section 72-2-118. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-401, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 11; 1990, ch. 301, § 2; ment, effective May 3, 1999, in Subsection (7) 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 178; substituted "Centennial Highway Fund" for 
1992, ch. 214, § 7; 1994, ch. 297, § 6; 1997, "Centennial Highway Trust Fund" and added 
ch. 172, § 7; 1997, ch. 272, § 1; 1998, ch. 95, "created under Section 72-2-118." 
§ 2; 1998, ch. 255, § 2; 1998, ch. 417, § 2; 
1999, ch. 21, § 18. 
19-6-410.5. Environmental assurance program — Partici-
pant fee. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Cash balance" means cash plus investments and current accounts 
receivable minus current accounts payable exclusive of the liabilities 
estimated by the state risk manager. 
(b) "Commission" means the State Tax Commission, as defined under 
Section 59-1-101. 
(2) There is created an Environmental Assurance Program. The program 
shall provide to participating owners and operators, upon payment of the fee 
imposed under Subsection (4), assistance with the costs of investigation, 
abatement, and corrective action regarding releases at facilities participating 
in the program, to the extent provided under Section 19-6-419. 
(3) Participation in the program is voluntary. 
(4) There is assessed an environmental assurance fee of VA cent per gallon on 
the first sale or use of petroleum products in the state. 
(5) Revenue collected under this section shall be deposited in the Petroleum 
Storage Tank Trust Fund created in Section 19-6-409 and used solely for the 
purposes under Section 19-6-409. 
(6) (a) The commission is responsible for the collection of the fee and any 
penalties and interest imposed under this section. 
(b) The commission shall by rule establish: 
(i) the method of payment of the environmental assurance fee; 
(ii) the procedure for reimbursement or exemption of owners or 
operators who do not participate in the program, including owners 
and operators of above ground storage tanks; and 
(iii) the procedure for confirming with the department those own-
ers and operators who qualify for reimbursement or exemption under 
Subsection (6)(b)(ii). 
(c) The commission may retain an amount not to exceed 2.5% of fees 
collected under this section for the cost to it of rendering its services. 
(7) The person or entity responsible for payment of the fee under this section 
shall pay the fee to the commission on or before the last day of the month 
following the month in which the sale occurs. 
(8) The payment under this section shall be accompanied by the form 
prescribed by the commission. 
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(9) (a) The penalties and interest for failure to file the form required under 
this section or to pay the environmental assurance fee are the same as the 
penalties and interest under Sections 59-1-401 and 59-1-402. 
(b) The commission shall deposit penalties and interest collected under 
this section in the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund. 
(10) The commission shall report to the department any person or entity 
who is delinquent in payment of the fee under this section. 
(11) (a) If the cash balance of the Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund on 
June 30 of any year exceeds $40,000,000, the assessment of the environ-
mental assurance fee as provided in Subsection (4) shall be suspended 
beginning November 1 and the suspension shall remain in effect through 
October 31 of the year in which the cash balance of the fund on June 30 has 
decreased to below $30,000,000. 
(b) The commission shall be responsible for determining each year the 
cash balance of the fund as of June 30. 
(c) Before September 1 of each year, the department shall provide the 
commission with the accounts payable of the fund as of June 30. 
History: C. 1953,19-6-410.5, enacted by L. (l)(a); divided Subsection (1), adding the Sub-
1997, ch. 172, § 8; 1998, ch. 95, § 3; 1999, ch. section (l)(b) designation; inserted the phrase 
118, § 1. beginning "deposited in" and ending "Section 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- 19-6-409 and" in Subsection (5); added Subsec-
ment, effective May 3, 1999, added Subsection tion (11); and made a punctuation change. 
19-6-416, Restrictions on delivery of petroleum — Civil 
penalty. 
(1) After July 1, 1991, a person may not deliver petroleum to, place 
petroleum in, or accept petroleum for placement in a petroleum storage tank 
that is not identified in compliance with Subsection 19-6-411(7). 
(2) Any person who delivers or accepts delivery of petroleum to a petroleum 
storage tank or places petroleum, including waste petroleum substances, in an 
underground storage tank in violation of Subsection (1) is subject to a civil 
penalty of not more than $500 for each occurrence. 
(3) The executive secretary shall issue a notice of agency action assessing z 
civil penalty of not more than $500 against any person who delivers or accepts 
delivery of petroleum to a petroleum storage tank or places petroleum 
including waste petroleum substances, in violation of Subsection (1) in z 
petroleum storage tank or underground storage tank. 
(4) A civil penalty may not be assessed under this section against any persoi 
who in good faith delivers or places petroleum in a petroleum storage tank oi 
underground storage tank that is identified in compliance with Subsectioi 
19-6-411(7) and rules made under that subsection, whether or not the tank i 
in actual compliance with the other requirements of Section 19-6-411. 
History: C. 1953, 26-14e-407, enacted by Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend 
L. 1989, ch. 268, § 17; 1990, ch. 301, § 7; ment, effective May 3, 1999, substituted "Sut 
renumbered by L. 1991, ch. 112, § 185; section 19-6-411(7)" for "Subsection 19-€ 
1992, ch. 214, § 14; 1996, ch. 162, § 2; 1999, 411(8)" in Subsections (1) and (4). 
ch. 21, § 19. 
